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ABSTRACT
Laskoski, Sara, M.A., Spring 2015

English Literature

Morphing Myths and Shedding Skins: Interconnectivity and the Subversion of the Isolated
Female Self in Angela Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride” and Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing
Chairperson: Dr. Louise Economides
This project is an analysis of the utilization of mythmaking and human-animal relationships
reflected in Angela Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride” and Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing. Carter and
Atwood show how societal restrictions can devalue the connections between the body, the mind,
and the natural world. Through the theoretical lenses of primarily post-structuralism and
ecofeminism, this project seeks to show how these two authors subvert isolated female identities
through the use of the fairy tale element of the human-animal transformation. This subversion
rejects dualistic tendencies of the dominant, patriarchal society, opening new ways of identifying
the self through interconnections otherwise rejected or ignored out of the fear of encountering
otherness. The formation of relational selves encourages both the communication with entities
beyond the human realm and also the engagement in creative deconstruction that helps establish
fluidity. Through their innovative uses of language, Carter and Atwood portray a movement
away from normative society towards an ambiguity that promotes diversified multiplicity.
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Introduction
Female-Animal Associations and Understanding the Relational Self
I will be focusing particularly on the human-animal divide by analyzing transformations
of females into animals within Angela Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride” and Margaret Atwood’s
Surfacing. Both Carter and Atwood represent the restrictions created by a dominant, patriarchal
society that separates the body, the mind, and the natural world. These boundaries, and the
negative connotations surrounding them, are deconstructed in a manner that places new emphasis
on the environment and the changing perceptions of the female protagonists. To do so, these two
authors take the fairy genre, seen particularly through the element of transformation, and actively
engage in mythmaking to break down certain restrictions that limit relational selves. Carter and
Atwood use mythmaking in uniquely different ways, which will be analyzed later in this
introduction. Through innovative uses of language, these authors express the need for new
human outlooks on the natural world that recognize interconnectivity as key to forming a fluid
rather than fixed self.
My analysis of Carter’s and Atwood’s transformative characters draws upon several
different theoretical lenses, including post-structuralism, postmodernism, animal studies, and
several branches of feminism. In terms of interconnectivity, Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix
Guattari’s postmodern and post-structural views on becoming and multiplicity, presented in A
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, provide an interesting base for understanding
the role of metamorphosis in breaking normative and often oppressive patterns. In “Romantic
Individualism, Animal Rights and the Challenge of Multiplicity,” Louise Economides analyses
these two theorists’ ideas on becoming, stating, “The shift away from ontological absolutism to a
phenomenology of becoming entails an understanding of how entities are, of necessity, always
already interconnected with other entities in novel configurations which cannot be reduced to the
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dualistic paradigms which structure desires in social strata.” Such transformative natures allow a
connection to form between humans and animals, disintegrating the human/animal binary that
has been established throughout Western history. Elizabeth Grosz, in Becoming Undone:
Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art, further notes the fluidity within Deleuze and
Guattari’s ideas, stating, “Becoming means that nothing is the same as itself over time, and
dispersion means that nothing is contained in the same space in this becoming” (96). Thus, the
ever-changing quality of becoming directly associates with alterity as one has continual
interactions with what has been deemed “other.” In this manner, the formation of a versatile self
occurs through a multiplicity of relationships that cannot be ignored. Grosz furthers this concept,
stating how sometimes
identity cannot be understood as what we are, the multiple, overlapping categories that
make us into subjects; rather, we are what we do and what we make, we are what we
generate, which may give us identity, but always an identity that is directed to our next
act, our next activity, rather than to the accretion of the categories that may serve to
describe us. (Emphasis added 98)
In other words, an identity does not exist as a fixed category determined by definitions of a
society; rather, identity intermingles with past, present, and future actions that bring the self into
constant interaction with other entities, both human and non-human.
This multiplicity leads to a destabilization of meanings that creates an ambiguous state of
being, commonly associated with difference and otherness. The destruction of order can incur a
certain fear of ambiguity and selflessness; this fear helps create the dualisms and other
boundaries that separate the human from the other. This separation promotes sameness by
making difference negative, as Mark Roberts discusses in The Mark of the Beast: Animality and
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Human Oppression: “some people have the right to exploit and master others because they are
different…Difference, in this respect, is a category of power, one that sets a particular group
above others, and, in so doing, claims mastery over those distinguished as others” (182).
Consequently, these barriers form isolated selves cut off from valuable relationships with the
environment and create a self-made blindness to the necessity of interconnections to humanity’s
own vitality.

I. Dualities, Value Hierarchies, and the Human/Animal Binary in Relation to the Feminine
While there are many cultural dualities that lead to the bifurcation from the other, the
central focuses for this thesis will be on the separation of the human from the animal, the male
from the female, the mind from the body, and the rational from the irrational. Historically,
dualisms have associated women with nature and men with reason (and therefore culture). In
“Introduction and Overview: Animal Others and Animal Studies,” Aaron Gross explains how
such binaries constrict movement, stating, “Western ontological dualism presupposes human
beings to be unique among all living things in that we alone are in possession of ‘mind’—that
creative and constructive cognitive apparatus that shapes, mediates, and imparts meaning onto
the things of the world around us” (26). In this manner, humanity situates itself on top of a
hierarchy that identifies and defines other entities, resulting in the oppression of those termed
“non-human” or other. Such subordination is not limited to the non-human but includes humans
as well. Ecofeminists, such as Val Plumwood and Karen Warren, have looked at the connections
between women and nature, and are particularly interested in how both can be dominated and
placed in the realm of the other. Plumwood argues in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature that
“both the dominant tradition of men as reason and women as nature, and the more recent
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conflicting one of men as forceful and wild and women as tamed and domestic, have had the
effect of confirming masculine power” (20). Western society thus reflects patriarchal domination
over subordinated groups, including women and nature. As Warren explains, “It is oppressive
conceptual frameworks and the behaviors, practices, policies, structures, institutions, and
socioeconomic conditions with which they interact that are at the heart of oppression and
unjustified domination of women, other human Others, and nonhuman nature” (“Introduction”
143). Along with this, Warren also associates these conceptual frameworks with what she
defines as “value hierarchies” that have been put in place by patriarchal society (Ecofeminist
Philosophy 46). Plumwood agrees, arguing that the rationality given to the dominant group
allows them to define what is valued and devalued: “Nature, as the excluded and devalued
contrast of reason, includes the emotions, the body, the passions, animality, the primitive or
uncivilized, the non-human world, matter, physicality and sense experience, as well as the sphere
of irrationality, of faith and of madness” (Feminism and the Mastery of Nature 19). These
dualisms exist because of cultural frameworks and restrictive language that attempts to
categorize what should exist independently from definitions; binaries are often maintained
through blindness or ignorance to the interconnectivity that exists between humans, animals, and
the natural world. In The Ethics of Vulnerability: A Feminist Analysis of Social Life and
Practice, Erinn Gilson discusses willful ignorance as a “kind of unconscious self-deception and,
more specifically, a self-deception oriented towards retaining privilege and eschewing
recognition of those facts that would destabilize privileged subjectivity” (86). Therefore, willful
ignorance as a means of maintaining privilege connects to Warren’s conversation on value and
the logic of domination, in which the group on top of the hierarchy controls those below through
a self-given sense of superiority (Ecofeminist Philosophy 47).
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Value hierarchies exist due to a history of subordination and should be deconstructed in a
manner that does not reject the other but rather embraces it as part of the self. In order to do so,
one must question what it means to be human. As Plumwood discusses, “The concept of the
human is itself very normative. The notion of being fully or properly human is made to carry
enormous positive weight, usually with little examination of the assumptions behind this, or the
inferiorisation of the class of non-human world” (Feminism and the Mastery of Nature 26). One
way to get beyond determined definitions of humanity that favor sameness is through the
recognition of multiplicity and the promotion of difference. Jane Bennett’s ideas on material
feminism in Vibrant Matter develop a means of understanding the human as a part of the whole
rather than being an isolated, superior entity in a supreme role. Bennett states, “What is also
needed is a cultivated, patient, sensory attentiveness to nonhuman forces operating outside and
inside the human body…Without proficiency in this countercultural kind of perceiving, the
world appears as if it consists only of active human subjects who confront passive objects and
their law-governed mechanisms” (xiv). In Bennett’s analysis, the other becomes not just situated
outside of the human but inside as well in the forms of certain materials that have become part of
the body; such materials include heavy metals and viruses (Bennett 112). This recognition of the
inability to separate the human from the non-human, even at the level of organisms in the body,
takes power away from hierarchies and oppressive ideas that seek to create such barriers. The
human body itself is vulnerable to the natural world because it is situated within unseen
ecological systems and not in the role of the master. Moreover, in Becoming Animal, David
Abram’s ideas connect to the need for reevaluating what it means to be human. He questions
patriarchal structure and the present concepts of value, stating, “They [feminists] questioned the
privilege accorded to abstract, disembodied styles of reflection and began to disclose the hidden,
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overlooked intelligence of the body itself, ascribing new value to corporeal forms of knowing”
(105). The formation of new ways of understanding value by rejecting hierarchal systems
creates a new means of viewing the body, human language, and identity in a way that expands
rather than restricts the self.
This thesis also attempts to understand the bonds humans have with the natural world and
why such connections are typically avoided out of fear, are negated, or are controlled by
dominant categorizations. The above conversation on multiplicity and becoming connects to
concepts presented by environmental theorist Robyn Eckersley in Environmentalism and
Political Theory, where she discusses ecocentrism, a belief that “the world is an intrinsically
dynamic, interconnected web of relations in which there are no absolute dividing lines between
the living and the nonliving, the animate and the inanimate, or the human and the nonhuman”
(49). Failure to recognize such interactions results in the formation of atomistic selves, or selves
that view the surrounding world through a narrow, “particle-like sense of self” (Eckersley 62).
Such a limited perspective forms an isolation that supports anthropocentrism, or “the belief that
there is a clear and morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the rest of nature, that
humankind is the only principal source of value and meaning in the world, and that nonhuman
nature is there for no other purpose but to serve humankind” (Eckersley 51).
These Western viewpoints that separate the natural world from humanity set oppressive
categorizations on certain groups of people in relation to dualisms such as the rational/irrational
and the human/animal. Ecocentrism and other terms are used in an attempt to show the
unavoidable connections that exist between humans and the natural world. For example, Warren
discusses the term relational selves, defining it as “as beings-in-relationships” that make
“relationships to others an integral, and not dispensable or ‘add on’ feature of one’s nature and
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identity as a self” (Ecofeminist Philosophy 128). Thus, the relational self counters the alienated,
atomistic self. Historically, females in particular have experienced a negative categorization. As
Eckersley relates, “At the symbolic and conceptual levels, both women and nonhuman nature
have been associated and downgraded in the God-Man-Woman-Nature hierarchy of being—a
conceptual schema that has served to legitimize the greater social status and power held by men
vis-à-vis women and nonhuman nature” (68). Such social frameworks limit creativity and
attempt to control the body as well as the mind. Furthermore, throughout Western history,
categorical values have been placed on the environment. In “Mirrors and Windows:
Sociocultural Studies of Human-Animal Relationships,” Molly Mullin shows how such values
reflect, “Definitions of nature, like definitions of human, are not…neutral but have been
continually constructed and reconstructed in political contexts in which they have reflected some
interests and not others” (213). Similarly, Carolyn Merchant believes that the term “‘nature’
(like ‘woman’) is ‘historically and socially constructed’” (qtd. in Rose 78), and reflects the
determined values of the dominant group.
The specific binary that separates the human from the animal becomes important to
analyze within my thesis because of the human-animal transformations that occur within Carter’s
and Atwood’s works; studying the ways they blur the boundary that separates humanity from the
animal realm will help show at what level the binary is deconstructed in their writings. In
Animal Rites, Cary Wolfe puts the separation between the human and animal into a historical
perspective, stating,
The figure of the ‘animal’ in the West…is part of a cultural and literary history stretching
back at least to Plato and the Old Testament, reminding us that the animal has always
been especially, frightfully nearby, lying in wait at the very heart of the constitutive

7

disavowals and self-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called ‘the
human.’ (6)
Wolfe’s statement helps show not only how long the separation between animals and humans has
existed but also presents why the boundary between them can be seen as blurred and constantly
moving—humans themselves can be defined as animals (Wolfe 6). Animals are deemed by
many as categorically inferior to humanity, mainly because of their inability to utilize human
language (Mullin 206). According Roberts, this lack of communication and therefore
rationalization reflects how, “Animals had become…constituted by what they lack and what they
fail to achieve of humanity” (14). The boundary between humans and animals therefore relates
directly to Warren’s conversation about value hierarchy, where human qualities are termed more
valuable than other intellects. Ironically, the definitions that seek to valorize humanity also serve
as oppressive tools against people degraded as animalistic. Such animalistic qualities, as Roberts
explains, “Bec[o]me[s] crucial to those who [seek] to victimize…the animal-like in the name of
reason, humanity, religion, morality, intellectual superiority, profit, normalcy, social progress, or
just plain good etiquette” (14). Roberts presents the negative manner animals and the animalistic
are perceived in hierarchal society. Moreover, the separation between animals and humans
largely exists out of a fear of being related to the animal. Mullin discusses this fear by studying
the mind/body dualism in relation to the human/animal. Historically, the human body has been
associated with bestial qualities that threaten the rational; due to this, the body represents
something to be controlled since, “humans were often perceived as sharing behaviors and
qualities with animals, encouraging the perception of a beast existing within humans, a beast that
required taming and vigilance” (Mullin 204). Due to this animal association, the body became
regulated and controlled within hierarchal constructions and norms (Gross 29). Furthermore, in
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Animals Erased: Discourse, Ecology, and Reconnection with the Natural World, Arran Stibbe
relates how, “In celebrating the linguistic and the rational, other aspects of being human (such as
emotions, feelings, embodiment, mortality, or dependence on a physical environment for
survival) are marginalized simply because they happen to be shared with other animals” (3). As
seen above, such bifurcation leads to a disconnection of the body from the mind and the human
from the animal, resulting in isolated selves.
It is important to note how individuals and groups of people are negatively associated
with the animal and therefore oppressed by Western society. While this thesis focuses mainly on
the relationship between animals and females, other bifurcated groups of people, such as the nonwhite, the colonized, the enslaved, the impoverished, and the insane, were commonly associated
with animals to justify and/or reflect inferiority when compared to the dominant, rational,
patriarchal culture (Mullin 204). Such restrictions span the issues of gender and race, and show
the power of the dominant group. Post-structuralist Jacques Derrida relates this superiority and
control of terminology in “The Animal Therefore I Am (More to Follow).” Derrida states,
“Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right to give…They have given
themselves the word in order to corral a large number of living beings within a single concept”
(400). Such power over categorization creates groups that are both de-humanized and
animalized, restricting identification within those groups. Richard Twine links this concept of
inferiority and superiority to the body in “Ma(r)king Essence-Ecofeminism and Embodiment.”
Twine states, “One’s membership of human citizenship (for this read membership of Western,
male, white, bourgeois-defined human identity) was measured in terms of one’s ability to
distance and deny such bodily functions which implied far too much commonality with the
‘irrational’ sphere of nature” (40). In a historical sense, women have been associated with the
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body, the irrational, and the animalistic, especially in terms of female sexuality. Roberts
particularly looks into the nineteenth century, where the patriarchy restricted female sexual
desires, for fear of a destabilization of social constructions, by “negatively link[ing] female
sexuality to animality, rendering it bestial, unspeakable, perverse, and humanly unthinkable”
(27). Such negative associations between the female and the animal (that still exist today) serve
to limit the freedom of the female body and remain embedded in a language created largely by
man (Spender 227). For example, in “Ecofeminism: Toward Global Justice and Planetary
Health,” Greta Gaard and Lori Gruen reflect on the “colloquialisms for women such as ‘pussy,’
‘bitch,’ ‘old hen,’ ‘sow,’ and the like serve to animalize women and, in cultures where animals
are seen as subordinate or inferior, thereby reinforce women’s inferior status” (159). Thus, the
creation of subordinated identities based on value-laden perspectives of the dominant (male)
group denies difference and serves to remove agency from humans, animals, and the natural
world (Twine 38).
The body as a basis of identification becomes an important aspect in this thesis because
of the impact culture has in forming identity. In Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler discusses how,
The category of ‘sex’ is, from the start, normative…‘sex’ not only functions as a norm,
but is part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs, that is, whose
regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce—
demarcate, circulate, differentiate—the body it controls. (1)
Through this quotation, Butler reflects on how normative society creates barriers around sex and
gender by controlling the body. In the works of Atwood and Carter, as the females begin to
transform into animals or recognize their animal “base,” they confront social restrictions placed
around them and seize the opportunity to enter a freeing state that does not limit movement of
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their identity based on sex or gender norms. Rather, ambiguity erases definitive lines as identity
becomes situated in interactions with the surrounding natural world. This ambiguity reflects
Hélène Cixous’s conversation about female individuality in “The Laugh of the Medusa”: “But
what strikes me is the infinite richness of their [womens’] individual constitutions: you can’t talk
about a female sexuality, uniform, homogeneous, classifiable into codes—any more than you
can talk about one unconscious resembling another” (347). Rather than exclusion, this
individuality and acceptance of difference relates to what Marilyn Frye defines as “loving
perception.” In “loving perception” or the loving eye, people, “‘Know the complexity of the
other as something that will forever present new things to be known.’ It is not an invasive,
coercive eye that annexes others to itself” (qtd. in Warren Ecofeminist Philosophy 104). This
loving perception rejects the “sameness” that “arrogant perception” creates through the value
hierarchy that “maintains sameness in such a way that it expands the moral community only to
those beings who are thought to resemble ‘us’ in some significant way” (Warren, Ecofeminist
Philosophy 105). Loving perception recognizes the differences and notices the similarities of
both the human and nonhuman realm, drawing upon interconnections that are otherwise invisible
in the dominant hierarchal value system.
Having interconnections with the surrounding world can disrupt the controlling
boundaries society places around people and their bodies. Abram studies this disruption by
looking at how the body interacts with the surrounding community and natural world:
The human body is not a closed or static object, but an open, unfinished entity utterly
entwined with the soils, waters, and winds that move through it—a wild creature whose
life is contingent upon the multiple other lives that surround it, and the shifting flows that
surge through it. (Becoming Animal 110)
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The recognition or rediscovery of the body becomes a means of communicating with the self, the
community, and the environment. Abram suggests that reason and emotion as well as the body
and the mind are all interconnected in a manner that allows the body itself to think (Becoming
Animal 105). Cixous furthers this idea by stating, “Censor the body and you sensor breath and
speech at the same time” (350). The expression and the identification of the self not only relates
to the mind but to the senses and feelings the body provides. By recognizing that the body itself
communicates, a new range of diversity takes form that does not limit but expands the nature,
thoughts, and creativity of humanity through an individuality created by multiplicity. In The
Spell of the Sensuous, David Abram states that awareness of “the intelligence that lurks in
nonhuman nature…temporarily shatters habitual ways of seeing and feeling, leaving one open to
a world all alive, awake, and aware” (19). This recognition of intelligence outside of humanity
allows the self to reach beyond the normative structures set in place, creating a diversity of
perceptions with a versatile sense of being. Rather than restrictive, language becomes innovative
as it extends to include the ever-changing other within as well as without. This suggests that
defining a permanent, fixed self is not possible because of the transformative nature of our
identities in constant interaction with the surrounding world. Rather, “To acknowledge that ‘I
am this body’ is not to reduce the mystery of my yearnings and fluid thoughts to a set of
mechanisms, or my ‘self’ to a determinate robot. Rather it is to affirm the uncanniness of this
physical form” (Abram, Spell of the Sensuous 46). By studying human-animal transformations,
the language of the body, once recognized, becomes a means of freedom from the limitations of
hierarchal and anthropocentric viewpoints.
Directly relating to the body is the idea that human language has the capacity to limit but
also expand conceptions of identity. The limiting factor of language is situated in the hierarchies
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and defined values of a society, which Lori Gruen reflects upon: “Ecofeminists believe that facts
are theory-laden, theories are value-laden, and values are molded by historical and philosophical
ideologies, social norms, and individual processes of categorization” (qtd. in Warren,
“Introduction” 146). Because values are directly associated to theory, there is a close association
made with language and dualistic tendencies. In Man Made Language, Dale Spender discusses
how language serves as a means of categorizing the world: “Language helps form the limits of
our reality. It is our means of ordering, classifying, and manipulating the world. It is through
language that we become members of a human community, that the world becomes
comprehensible and meaningful” (3). Here, Spender recognizes both the capacity of language as
a creator and as a limitation to individuals and relationships. The title Spender uses also serves
to show how language has historically been man-made, serving to create, “only a partial view of
the world and yet they [men] are in a position to insist that their views and values are the ‘real’
and only values; and they are in a position to impose their version on other human beings who do
not share their experience” (Spender 1-2). Hence, language and rhetoric have been dominated by
the perceptions of the dominant society, reminiscent of the arrogant eye. Cixous builds on this
concept of domination, stating, “Nearly the entire history of writing is confounded with the
history of reason, of which it is at once the effect, the support, and one of the privileged alibis. It
has been one with the phallocentric tradition” (350). According to Cixous, the “history of
reason” limits the communication of the body by forming restrictions around the female that
prevent the entire “Self” from speaking. In terms of gender, Butler recognizes how “The naming
[of gender] is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm”
(Bodies that Matter 8). Thus, identity becomes situated within a language of a given society,
restricting movement.
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Language as constricting can also produce feelings of abjection that Julia Kristeva
discusses in “Approaching Abjection.” She states, “It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health
that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, and order. What does not respect
borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (5). Reflective of
Butler’s discussion of the rejection of bodies that matter, Kristeva notes how disturbances in the
set boundaries of social constructions can lead to feelings of abjection and fear. This fear, in
turn, becomes a powerful wall that places the indefinable other in a negative light. Kristeva
states, “But that word, ‘fear’—a fluid haze…no sooner has it cropped up than it shades off like a
mirage and permeates all words of the language with nonexistence…Thus, fear having been
bracketed, discourse will seem tenable only if it ceaselessly confronts that otherness…the abject”
(6). In this manner, the abject other becomes situated inside a language based on fear that serves
to separate the other from the self. For example, Twine connects this abjection to the body,
stating, “Bodies then (as conceived) can be seen as disruptive sources of abjection, which render
uncertain the neat attempts at boundary construction of Western history” (38). Fear of disruption
leads to the negative bifurcation of those different from the dominant group. In many ways, the
environment and the animalistic (in relation to humanity) are placed in the realm of the abject
other. For example, Stibbe states that certain languages support “a conceptualization of
ecosystems as existing separately from humans, like supermarkets for humans rather than as
systems where all life is mutually sustained” (66). In this sense, such alienation makes the
constant interaction between humans and the natural world, including animals, invisible; this
serves a negative purpose because it removes human perceptiveness on the dependency of the
natural world, resulting in limited care. Similarly, Abram focuses on this fear and discomfort
with the other, specifically the environment, claiming that “Only by welcoming uncertainty from
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the get-go can we acclimate ourselves to the shattering wonder that enfolds us. This animal body,
for all its susceptibility and vertigo, remains the primary instrument of all our knowing, as the
capricious earth remains our primary cosmos” (Becoming Animal 8). In other words, despite the
fear of ambiguity, Abram suggests that humans should embrace the different types of knowledge
that can be gained through relationships outside of the human restrictions of sameness.
Recognizing the altering nature of social constructions encourages interrelationships and
new modes of knowledge. Butler discusses how social constructions and “regulatory schemas
are not timeless structures, but historically revisable criteria of intelligibility which produce and
vanquish bodies that matter” (Bodies that Matter 14). This “revisable” quality leads to a hope
that the other can be viewed in a manner that breaks through constricting boundaries. Warren
expresses this revision as an ecofeminist goal, stating, “a central project of ecofeminism is to
creatively replace structures, practices and policies of unjustified domination with genuinely
non-oppressive liberating, life-affirming, cooperative, and just ones” (“Introduction” 140). The
restrictions of language can be challenged with the language of the body (discussed above). I am
interested in how language has the ability to transform negative, dualistic ways of thinking in an
innovative manner and how storytelling/mythmaking can transform (and be transformed by)
people, cultures, and identities. Cixous recognizes the boundaries of language but has faith in
the power of words as well: “Writing is precisely the very possibility of change, the space that
can serve as a springboard for subversive thought, the precursory movement of a transformation
of social and cultural structures” (350). For Cixous, writing holds the potential for
deconstruction and reformation of constricting social limitations.
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II. Fairy Tales, Mythmaking, and Identity in the Fiction of Carter and Atwood
Thus, I will focus particularly on the divide between the human and the non-human by
analyzing transformations of females into animals within the works of Carter and Atwood. I will
address both the restrictive and freeing tendencies of language and the importance of recognizing
interconnections with the natural world. Both authors show how language becomes important in
reflecting on the restrictions of society but also in the deconstruction of boundaries surrounding
one’s identity. Cixous’s argument that the body speaks relates to Abram’s ideas of
interconnectivity and the importance of recognizing that the world cannot be defined. For how
can you define an ever-changing entity that experiences constant metamorphosis? Words have
the power to control, as seen in the dualisms presented, but they also have the power to break
through such restrictions. Therefore, language and storytelling become tools for rejecting
boundaries, experiencing relationships, and encouraging creativity. I chose Carter and Atwood
in particular because of their creative uses of language along with their unique perspectives on
how both the female and the animal can experience degradation due to social constructions.
Furthermore, the concept of the embodied, transforming self coincides with the disintegration of
dualisms, leading to freedom and new ways of viewing other intelligences beyond the human.
Carter and Atwood both reflect on societal restrictions of the self that devalue the connections
between the body, the mind, and the natural world.
Hence, this thesis specifically analyzes how the human-animal transformational
experiences in “The Tiger’s Bride” and Surfacing subvert isolated female identities to create
relational selves that deconstruct the restrictions patriarchal society has over language, the mind,
and the body; these fluid selves exist in the realm of creative difference rather than a sameness
that forms oppressive (and potentially violent) binaries between the self and the other, the human
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and the animal, and the male and the female. The ambiguity of Carter’s and Atwood’s writing
styles as well as their use of fairy tales and mythmaking generate this realm of difference open to
new ways of identifying the self through interconnections otherwise rejected or ignored out of
fear of the other. In terms of mythmaking, Atwood and Carter both take part in recreating or
forming new myths that involve deconstructing restrictions and showing the potential
relationships between their characters and the natural world, particularly animals. However, they
use mythmaking in different ways: Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride” reveals an optimistic, poststructuralist approach that seeks to equalize relationships. Atwood’s Surfacing reflects on the
power myths have in our lives while recognizing the caution required when taking part in
mythopoeic creations. These differences will be analyzed in further detail later in this
introduction and the individual chapters.
I have structured my two main chapters in similar ways, with Chapter One focusing on
Carter and Chapter Two on Atwood. In simplistic terms, my chapters can tentatively be broken
down in the following manner: First, I analyze how patriarchal values, dualities, and language
limit the female characters. Second, I go into how the two narrators’ begin to break down these
dualities and/or recognize their degradation, particularly through their relationships with animals
(and the human/animal binary). Third, I study their transformational experiences from isolated
into relational selves, and whether or not these transformations are successful. My chapter on
Atwood contains a fourth step: the narrator’s potentially problematic reintegration into society.
Throughout both chapters, I analyze how Carter and Atwood utilize mythmaking and fairy tales,
which I will now introduce in further detail.
Along with their utilization of animal-becomings, a particular focus will be primarily on
how Carter and Atwood use fairy tales and mythmaking as means of mediating violence and
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power within their works. In terms of fairy tales, the human-animal transformation is a popular
theme in the context of many Euro-American tales. Importantly, traditional folktales of the past
addressed (and attempted to understand) violent acts, existing relationships, and the position of
power within a given society (Zipes, Breaking the Magic Spell 191). For modern patriarchal
society, fairy tales are a key genre in policing the boundaries between the human/animal and the
male/female binaries (Zipes, Breaking the Magic Spell 2). Such control is done through the
utilization of morals and a distinct separation between good and evil. Also associated to the fairy
tale narrative in Western culture is the concept of censorship, which appears in similar ways in
Carter’s and Atwood’s works. Both authors criticize censorship, particularly the whitewashing
of modern fairy tales, with Carter returning to the darkness situated in original tales and Atwood
critiquing the economic motives of such censorship. In Breaking the Magic Spell: Radical
Theories of Folk and Fairy Tales, Jack Zipes notes how this censorship exists in a capitalist
context, “Profit mars [traditional] stories and their cultural heritage. Folk and fairy tales as
products of the imagination are in danger of becoming instrumentalized and commercialized”
(2). It is also important to note that while Carter recreates fairy tales in a manner that clearly
shows connections with specific traditional tales, Atwood focuses more on specific themes of the
fairy tale genre rather than one particular tale.
It is essential to show how I am viewing myths and mythmaking within my research. I
take particular interest in not just recognizing myth as synonymous to the folktale/fairytale but
also reflecting on myth in relation to social practices. In other words, my analysis includes how
people engage with myths on an everyday basis and how mythmaking is an essential part to
interpreting (and forming) an identity or collective society. In “Sociological-ideological
Expression and Affirmation of Social Reality in Myth,” Bronislaw Bajon establishes this role of
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myths in society: “Myths grapple with contemporary problems and adjusts itself to the everchanging social and cultural situation, and, as such, is subject to modification. In essence, to
understand the structure and function of myths helps us to understand the social structure” (25).
This statement acknowledges how myths, social and otherwise, can impact and be impacted by
people and cultures. Because of these interactions, social myths, like fairy tales, can undergo
transformations themselves throughout history. Taking part in mythmaking can be a means of
limiting or expanding creativity and freedom in a culture, as my analysis of Carter and Atwood
will show. I will now briefly review the critical lenses surrounding each author and their literary
works to present the major concepts of focus.
Carter’s use of the fairy tale genre is one that self-consciously recognizes the social
myths that exist in both past fairy tales and in her own re-created fairy tales. She deconstructs
the concluding morals added to traditional fairy tales that support the patriarchal political agenda
in order to reconstruct the relationships they present. She also breaks down the role of violence
directed towards the other, particularly in the aggressor versus victim binary, in an attempt at
equalizing the parties involved. In her deconstruction, Carter re-vitalizes the importance of
understanding relationships and presents potential models of co-existence, particularly between
humans and animals. Through this perspective, Carter appears to recognize that “the creative
purpose and major themes of the fairy tales did not concern harmony, but the depiction of
changing social structures and alternative forms of behavior so that new developments and
connections between humans and things could be better grasped by the people” (Zipes, Breaking
the Magic Spell 191). In referencing traditional folktales, Carter also recognizes that fairy tales
of the past were not meant solely for children (Zipes, Breaking the Magic Spell 198). In this
context, Carter’s many versions of the same fairy tale associate more with the ephemeral nature
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of folktales within an oral tradition than the permanent morality of the penned down, literary
versions of the tales (Zipes, Breaking the Magic Spell 14). Carter does not seek to define a
single, static moral—instead she presents a variety of interpretations that reflect the
transformative nature of fairy tales and how they serve as a means of negotiating various
identities and interrelationships. In terms of myths, both in fairy tales and in society, Carter
states, “I believe that all myths are products of the human mind and reflect only aspects of
material human practice. I’m in the demythologizing business” (qtd. in Gamble 12). This
quotation reflects how Carter uses the fairy tale genre to challenge traditional beliefs and myths
developed by society. Her “demythologizing business” is her post-structuralist style of
deconstruction and reconstruction of social myths through the fairy tale genre.
Carter’s reinterpretations of the fairy tale genre analyze and reconstruct the roles of
violence, human-animal relations, and sexuality. Her stories contain elements of the first print
version of fairy tales, notably those written down by Charles Perrault, such as “Little Red Riding
Hood.” However, the main focus for this thesis will be on Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride,” which is
based on the fairy tale “Beauty and the Beast.” According to Anne Altmann and Gail De Vos in
Tales, Then and Now, the most popular version of “Beauty and the Beast” was written in 1756
by Madame Jeanne-Marie le Prince de Beaumont but can be traced back to Madame GabrielleSuzanne de Villeneuve’s 1740 novel length version (4). “The Tiger’s Bride” presents a femaleanimal transformation that grounds itself in equality between the protagonist and The Beast in a
state of mutual vulnerability. The transformation focuses on freedom from hierarchal restrictions
as the foundations of such limiting structures are shaken to the point of destruction. In this
manner, the protagonist chooses to reject her mechanistic identity produced by the patriarchy in
favor of an ambiguous state of being open to relationships beyond humanity. Furthermore,
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through her transformation, her body is no longer objectified and she is able to embrace alternate
forms of language and intelligence. An analysis of the fairy tale presents interesting ideas
concerning the animal/human binary and ideas of anthromorphism, especially in relation to the
social conformity of The Beast. Through this retelling, Carter questions definitive structures, the
subordination of the feminine, and the fear that can exist in the face of the unknown; by
overcoming this fear of indefiniteness, the protagonist experiences a freedom that involves the
shattering of a fixed self.
In “Angela Carter’s The Bloody Chamber and the Decolonization of Feminine
Sexuality,” Merja Makinen comments on how Carter “argued that even though the seventeenthand eighteenth-century aristocratic writers ‘fixed’ these tales by writing them down and added
moral tags to adapt them into parables of instruction for children, they could not erase the
darkness and the magic” (4) of the tales passed down through oral tradition. Carter’s fascination
with the original “darkness” of such tales is reflected in her writing and her own comments about
her fairy tales in The Bloody Chamber: “I was using the latent content of those traditional
stories…And that latent content is violently sexual’” (qtd. in Sheets 642). Her retellings also
challenge (and destroy) the morals and conventions of the original fairy tales, which is reflected
in Carter’s comment, “I am all for putting new wine in old bottles, especially if the pressure of
the new wine makes the old bottles explode” (qtd. in Makinen 5). Indeed, Carter’s fairy tales
often lead to an explosion not just of the original structure but from critics as well. Carter’s
writing was (and remains) under the particular scrutiny of feminists, and major controversies
over her fairy tales revolve around gender relations, pornography, and sadomasochism. To
provide an example of such controversies, consider Makinen’s statement: “Many a reader has
found savagery with which she [Carter] can attack cultural stereotypes disturbing, even
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alienating. Personally I found (and find) it exhilarating—you never knew what was coming next
from the avant-garde literary terrorist of feminism” (2). Along with the elaborate categorization
of Carter, this statement provides insight to the discomfort that Carter’s writing can cause. It is
in this discomfort Carter’s power lies—she is not afraid to draw upon the abject. According to
Kimberly Lau in “Erotic Infidelities: Angela Carter's Wolf Trilogy,” her fairy tales show,
“Carter’s desire to voice instability, [and] to tell tales with a multivocal tongue” (Lau 79) in a
manner that toys with the “animalistic” categorizations of sexuality and dualistic notions of
gender.
Similar to Carter, Atwood’s use of fairy tale elements and mythmaking provides a
method of negotiating violence, power, and relationships. Of particular concern in Surfacing is
the patriarchal notion that having power inevitably produces violence against another. In the
case of gender roles, this falls into the male as aggressor/female as victim binary, with Atwood’s
protagonist perceiving herself in the role of the victim. Atwood’s use of the fairy tale genre is
designed to critique the censorship of violence, fear, and the body in children’s tales. Fairy tale
themes of metamorphosis, amputation, and power relations also are presented throughout
Atwood’s work (Wilson 119). Atwood, like Zipes, seems to recognize and critique modern
escapist versions of tales, wherein, “the tales no longer served their original purpose of clarifying
social and natural phenomena but bec[o]me forms of refuge and escape in that they made up for
what people could not realize in society” (Zipes, Breaking the Magic Spell 196). Such escapism
(and the issue with it) is presented throughout Surfacing. Furthermore, Atwood’s use of the fairy
tale genre fits together with the myths of the masculine frontier, primitivism, and the narrator’s
falsification of her own past as she unconsciously creates her own myths even as she criticizes
others.

22

Atwood takes a critical perspective on how mythmaking is integrated into society within
literature and culture. In particular, she recognizes the myths that surround female writers. In an
interview with Bruce Meyer and Brian O’Riordan, Atwood was asked if there was one particular
myth about herself and her writing that she would like to correct. Atwood responded,
Myths tend to explode themselves…I’ve had Medusa. I’ve had the Virgin Mary. You
wouldn’t believe the stuff that started coming out when I had a baby…I was still the same
person, but they used a different iconography. I’ve been accused of hating women. I’ve
been accused of hating men. I’ve been accused of not hating either of them enough.
(Meyer and O’Riordan 153)
In this case, it is important to note how myths are being connected to gender prejudices in terms
of female writers, with Atwood being presented as Medusa, the Virgin Mary, and the loving
mother. Her response shows the variety of critiques Atwood gets from her works that revolve
around representations of gender. In Engendering Genre, Reingard Nischik discusses Atwood’s
frustration with what she calls “the F-question,” or the question of whether she considers herself
a feminist writer (184). From this, Nischik remarks how, “a female writer presenting her stories
from a woman’s perspective is branded a ‘feminist,’ whereas a male writer doing the same from
a male perspective is simply the norm and is not branded a ‘masculinist’ writer” (184). Atwood
resists these distinctions, and she reflects upon the possibility that the female writer can now be
seen as “neither nun nor orgiastic priestess, neither more nor less than human. Nevertheless, the
mythology still has power, because such mythologies about women still have power” (qtd. in
Nischik 188). Atwood recognizes the power such myths can have in the formation of a social
identity. Myths are within the very fabric of humanity, and Atwood appears to suggest the
impossibility of ever truly separating from these myths. In “Social Myths in Political and
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Literary Contexts,” Nurith Gertz studies how myths can be negative and controlling to identity,
stating, “A society’s conventional myths…convey an agreed-upon meaning of which the
individual is not always consciously aware” (623). Becoming aware of restrictive social myths
becomes important to the demythologizing process. Though she focuses on how myths can be
negative, Atwood also shows the positives that can come from recreating myths that were once
restricting. Atwood’s praise of Carter in particular seems to suggest the importance of
challenging order and how writing itself becomes a method of breaking down myths: “all things
bright and beautiful, as well as all things gnarled and macabre, appeal to her [Carter], and she
filches them with abandon, picks them apart, sticks them together again in a new order, and adds
them to her deliberately cluttered verbal nest” (Atwood, Writing with Intent 152).
Atwood’s novel Surfacing focuses on how society and language can prevent
interconnections from forming between humans and the natural world. Such boundaries limit the
physical, social, and emotional movement of the main female characters, particularly the
nameless narrator. The narrator’s isolation exists not only because of hierarchal boundaries but
also her own self-made barriers that block out past traumatic events. Such alienation cuts her off
from meaningful relationships both within and outside of the human realm. Hence, Surfacing
reflects upon the danger of separating the mind from the body as well as the rational from the
irrational. As the novel progresses, the narrator undergoes a transformation that leads her to
reject everything human-made, including her friends and her job. She leaves civilization to
become an animal, uniting herself with the natural world and developing a sense of
nondestructive power. The narrator’s transformation does not physically change her into an
animal; instead, she mentally becomes joined with the environment and the animals within it,
developing a constantly changing, fluid identity that exists in ambiguity. Throughout the novel,
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the narrator reflects on the killing mentality of humans, sympathizes with animals, and perceives
the interconnections between humanity and the nature that others avoid out of fear or ignorance.
There is a clear representation of how hierarchal definitions of value can be limiting and lead to
violence against those undervalued (women) or outside (animals) of the value hierarchy.
Atwood’s writing reflects how language can be used in an innovative manner even as her story
shows the restrictions that surround human communication.
However, Atwood’s Surfacing takes a more conservative stance when it comes to
mythmaking than Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride.” Primarily, Atwood reflects a more cautious
approach to mythmaking in comparison to Carter’s deconstruction of hierarchal morality in order
to reconstruct the relationships they present (particularly between the human and the animal). In
doing so, Carter celebrates deconstruction and reconstruction as potential equalizing agents.
Surfacing presents mythmaking in a more pessimistic light. The narrator’s use of myths in
Surfacing becomes problematic in the manner she whitewashes violence from her life. In her
transformative state, the flawed narrator begins to deconstruct the myths she has surrounded
herself with by unconsciously clinging to new, problematic myths associated with primitivism
and escapist ideals of wilderness. Particularly, the narrator attempts to negotiate the violence
directed at women and nature by radically rejecting society for the natural world, unaware that
she falls into the trap of living out a primitive, frontier myth that does not give her the means to
“positively” re-join the dominant culture. Such unconscious mythmaking is dangerous because
it creates idealizations and half-truths, forming barriers that restrict the potential of a co-existing
relationship between humanity and nature. The “cautionary” aspect of mythmaking presented in
Surfacing therefore has to do with the limitations existing in a mythologized “iconic” state that
unconsciously blocks potential interconnections. In this manner, Atwood represents the
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mythmaking process as far more risky when compared to Carter’s post-structuralist optimism of
the power that comes by appropriating myth.
Analyzing human-animal-nature relationships within the fiction of Carter and Atwood
develops further perceptions on violence and power, interconnectivity, and the importance of
recognizing relationships. Through the use of fairy tales and myths, both authors deconstruct the
stable, egocentric self by positioning it in an indefinable realm where transformations can occur;
such ambiguity opens the way for the development of relational selves existing outside of
normativity. In doing so, other languages may form or be discovered; such languages can be
based on feelings and connections that do not have to do with fear and exploitation but rather a
care and deeper understanding of the surrounding environment. These innovative forms of
communication place relevance on participatory actions of humanity, since “Each thing, each
being, is in steady intercourse with the entities and elements around it, negotiating its passage
and exerting its participation in the ongoing emergence of what it is” (Abram, Becoming Animal
51). By recognizing that the body itself communicates, a new type of intelligence is formed that
expands thoughts and creativity. This unique communication blurs the divide between humans
and the natural world. Rather than being restrictive, language and knowledge extend to include
the ever changing other that exists within as well as without; this suggests that defining a
monolithic, static self is impossible due to the transformative nature of our identities. Such multidimensional identities reflect Cixous’s definition of womanhood: “If she is a whole, it’s a whole
composed of parts that are wholes, not simple partial objects but a moving, limitlessly changing
ensemble” (357). Through this recognition of interconnectivity, care for the environment can
become engrained within the fabric of a culture, one that “defend[s] an ethic based on the moral
significance of care and for a reconceptualization of the human self as a social, relational,
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embedded ecological self” (Warren, “Introduction” 149). In forming such a self, more
ecocentric outlooks can develop that do not restrict the other within destructive mentalities, such
as hierarchal values, that often lead to the subordination of people and the natural world. As a
whole, this thesis reflects on the isolation that results in the maintenance of structural boundaries,
and the freedom that can occur in the deconstruction of a fixed self in favor of a relational,
transformative identity that experiences constant exchange with others.
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Chapter One
“I suffered a marvelous wound”: The Deconstruction of Isolated Selves into Multitudinous
Entities in “The Tiger’s Bride”
In “Penetrating to the Heart of the Bloody Chamber: Angela Carter and the Fairy Tale,”
Sarah Gamble states, “According to Carter, fairy tales have always existed in a kind of
communal melting pot, narrative raw material that anyone who wishes to can access and
reconfigure in forms to suit a particular purpose” (22). Carter utilizes the fairy tale genre to
destabilize and question the restrictive structures of both stories and Western society. In “The
Logic of the Same and Différance,” Anny Crunelle-Vanrigh analyzes how Carter’s innovative
writing deconstructs order: “She [Carter] takes her reader along the paths of indeterminacy,
reveling in a state of never-ending metamorphosis, as she disseminates her stories through The
Bloody Chamber” (117). In other words, Carter’s fairy tales upend the idea there is an
authentically “original” and authoritative version of fairy tales via her retellings and rejection of
any sort of categorization. In this “deconstruction of form and genre” (Crunelle-Vanrigh 124),
Carter’s stories leave room for questions concerning the relationships between the human, the
non-human, and the surrounding world, thus rejecting essentialist beliefs that attempt to define
entities based on particular boundaries and characteristics. These questions remain unanswerable
because Carter’s writing rejects dualistic notions of control. “The Tiger’s Bride,” first published
in The Bloody Chamber and Other Stories (1979), takes elements from de Beaumont’s “Beauty
and the Beast” to reinterpret the relationship between humans and animals both within and
outside of the constructed boundaries of a patriarchal society. Carter’s Beauty, an unnamed
female protagonist, experiences alienation as a result of her objectified status in a normative
culture that rejects difference in the form of the abject other. Through the process of a humananimal transformation, the female protagonist begins to connect with entities outside of
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humanistic terms and in the realm of the other, namely the animal. In doing so, she subverts her
socially defined identity and becomes a fluid rather than fixed self, undergoing constant change
as she interacts with other beings; through her formation of a relational self, Carter’s protagonist
experiences a freedom of identity that cannot be defined and exhibits a high potential for
creativity through her openness with other modes of intelligence outside of the anthropocentric
sphere. Such a focus on interconnectivity shows Carter’s interest in how original folktales were
used as a means of understanding relationships. Through use of the fairy tale genre, Carter
deconstructs relationships with a particular focus on power and violence, and then reconstructs
them to show the polymorphic quality of a self in constant interaction with others. Carter
therefore post-structurally engages in a celebratory mode of mythmaking that seeks to
continuously break down and reform past and current myths. Carter’s reconstructions serve to
continuously negotiate relationships, particularly between humans and animals, in manner that
progressively suggests the potential for a nondestructive co-existence based on equality.
Carter’s writing serves to extricate meanings from traditional retellings and hone in on
unacknowledged or ignored aspects of the fairy tale. Crunelle-Vanrigh particularly analyzes
Carter’s focus on the margins, stating,
She [Carter] is not one for comfortable truths….She goes for the margins—some might
say the throat. She splits open closed texts and revels in what she finds there, blood,
scars, perversion. She puts her dialectic of repetition and difference at the service of a
revaluation of the marginal that is the feminine, sabotaging—as she would—patriarchal
structures and pallogocentrism, indulging in the fantasy of an undecidable being. (130)
By existing within the margins, Carter’s writing explores a territory of the objectified and abject
other; in doing so, a new means of viewing “the other” forms, morphing traditional fairy tales
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through the perspective of an “undecidable” or unidentifiable being. In doing so, agency is
situated away from the dominant group and given to the subordinated, namely the female and the
animal. Crunelle-Vanrigh notes the dominant structure as restrictive, especially for the female
body in a patriarchal society. In many ways, Carter’s fairy tales reflect elements of what Aidan
Day terms as fantastic literature in Angela Carter: The Rational Glass. Fantastic literature
“seeks to articulate what has been repressed, and hence articulates the unconscious…which lies
outside the conscious, day-to-day dimension that is regulated through norms and
codes…inseparable from language” (6). By articulating repression found inside the margins of
society, Carter is bringing the unconscious into the light. Carter’s unconscious can therefore
originate from the abject, a realm that exists due to fear or chosen ignorance, thus making her
writing at times discomforting. At the same time, Carter’s work does exist within the world of
the conscious because her writing serves to question the individual in terms of the society that
surrounds and creates the said individual. Particularly, Carter’s focus on issues surrounding
sexuality and gender distinctions reflects how her writing can exist within the conscious, present
society (Day 7).
Carter’s writing, particularly “The Tiger’s Bride,” provides interesting interpretations of
the placement of value within the patriarchal society that shows how such value can be
restrictive particularly for the animal and the female. In “Angela Carter’s Animal Tales:
Constructing the non-human,” Mary Pollock studies Carter’s use of the animal, stating, “These
contacts [between human and animal] take shape within an alien discourse, or alien discourses,
which, if they can never be translated into the human, can at least be understood darkly when we
manage to minimalize our own investments in the symbolic order” (39). Pollock’s statement
hones in on the “symbolic order” that attempts to structure and define existence. This connects
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to Jacques Lacan’s analysis of symbolic order that exists within a pre-destined context that
structures the unconscious of humanity (Grosz 90); this order becomes a hierarchy based on a
value system created by the dominant group. Ecofeminist Karen Warren terms this as valuehierarchal thinking, or “Up-Down” thinking, which “attributes greater value to that which is
higher” (Ecofeminist Philosophy 46). Privilege and value go hand in hand, thus giving the
dominant group power over what is determined as inferior. Particularly, the oppression of
females and animals through binaries serve as examples of how value can lead to subordination,
depending on what is valued in a given society. In terms of animals, language plays a major role
in silencing the oppressed (similar to the silencing of “othered” human groups). Pollock’s term,
“alien discourse,” in many ways reflects the confining nature of language as a whole. The term
itself is restrictive but suggests the need for a communication beyond human language to exist in
order to create a new understanding that deconstructs the nature of the “symbolic order,” where
humans hold a self-appointed supremacy and therefore control; “alien discourse” further
suggests a discourse with the other that may underscore the dominant role of the human,
particularly the men. This symbolic order connects to Wolfe’s discussion of Western
subjectivity’s symbolic economy, defined as “an institution that relies on the tacit agreement that
the full transcendence of the ‘human’ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal’ and the animalistic,
which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy” (6). Wolfe’s symbolic economy includes
humans who have been oppressed by being associated with animalistic qualities. Therefore, the
animal/human duality becomes used as a means of justifying domination based on the logic of
the Upper group (Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy 47). Carter deconstructs this justification by
rejecting the Western ideology that “allow[s] not only a classification of beasts based on
empirical data, but placement[s] within a hierarchy of value [wherein]…it is man who decides

31

the relative value of other animals” (Pollock 36). Value becomes situated in the definitions
created by the dominant society, as Warren suggests above.
In “The Tiger’s Bride,” Carter reexamines and changes the conventional themes that exist
in the traditional tales, particularly de Beaumont’s version of “Beauty and the Beast.” In
recreating the fairy tale, Carter subverts the patriarchal “morals” and values that the original
telling implied, particularly those concerning sexuality and gender. De Beaumont’s version
exemplified the morality of the time period by supporting patriarchal value systems of female
virtue and obedience. “Beauty and the Beast” was published in The Young Misses Magazine,
with an intended readership of twelve to eighteen-year-old girls (Altmann and de Vos 4).
Through this perspective, de Beaumont’s fairy tale placed importance on virtue over beauty or
intelligence, especially when looking for characteristics within a potential spouse (Altmann and
de Vos 6). This is clearly seen in the description of Beauty’s two sisters’ husbands: “The eldest
had married a gentleman, extremely handsome indeed, but so fond of his own person that he was
full of nothing but his own dear self…The second had married a man of wit, but he only made
use of it to plague and torment everybody” (de Beaumont 144). Through this description, de
Beaumont presents a warning to young girls who seek love in good looks or wit over virtue, a
warning that is further established when Beauty tells the Beast, “Among mankind…there are
many that deserve that name [Beast] more than you, and I prefer you, just as you are, to those,
who, under a human form, hide a treacherous, corrupt, and ungrateful heart” (de Beaumont 143).
All the quotations from de Beaumont’s version that I give on this page suggest that a virtuous
“heart” should be valued above all else, positioning such a person (even with an “animalistic”
lack of wit) as superior over other suitors who do not hold this virtue. Interestingly, it is the
physical and mental inadequacies that Beauty needs to overlook to accept the marriage proposal
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from the Beast (de Beaumont 145). In From the Beast to the Blond, Marina Warner notes that de
Beaumont’s job as a governess to young girls added to her wish to “rais[e] her pupils to face
their future obediently and decorously, to hear her pious wish that her pupils obey their fathers
and that inside the brute of a husband who might be their appointed lot, the heart of a good man
might beat” (293). In such a manner, de Beaumont suggests that to obtain happiness her female
pupils must hold the virtues of “industriousness, self-sacrifice, modesty, and diligence” (Zipes,
Beauties, Beasts, and Enchantments 232). Such virtues concentrate on obedience and predates
the angel of the house notion that would appear later in Victorian society where the feminine
existed in a domestic, purifying realm for the corrupt, masculine society to come home to
(Warner 294). Humorously, Warner states that Carter takes these conventional themes, and
“turn[s] [them] inside out and upside down; in a mischief, she [seizes] the chance to mawl
governessy moralizers” (308). Carter takes the traditional storyline of de Beaumont’s “Beauty
and the Beast” and creates a tale of interrelationships that threaten (and destroy) the boundaries
society has built to maintain the distinctions between the “bestial” male and the virtuous female,
the self and the other, and the human and the animal.
In “The Tiger’s Bride,” the transformation of the main female character into a beast
rejects a hierarchal value system that prevents or refuses to see the interconnections between the
mind, body, and natural world. Carter’s female protagonist in “The Tiger’s Bride” at first
exhibits an isolated identity restricted by boundaries based on the male/female,
rational/irrational, mind/body binaries that exist in the patriarchal system. These dualities create
a structure similar to that in Gilles Deleuze’s discussion of Platonism in his article, “Plato and
the Simulacrum”: “Platonism…is content to stake out the territory, which is to say to ground it,
to select it, to exclude from it everything that threatens to confuse its boundaries” (50). The
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Platonic model, privileging ‘ideal’ forms over actual, sensory phenomena, is thus based on
sameness rather than difference and “Domination is built in such dualisms because the other is
negated in the process of defining a powerful self” (Gaard and Gruen 159). The “powerful self”
in this case becomes the protagonist’s father, who represents patriarchal control and society.
This power subordinates women (such as the protagonist) through oppression, which Gilson
discusses,
Oppression not only works through rejection—rejection of ‘foreign’ and devalued others,
rejection of relation and connection to these others, rejection of their impact on the self
and the self’s formation in relation to them—but through the production of and adherence
to norms…inciting us to attain the normative ideal. (92)
Gilson’s statement shows how people can be rejected not only by being undervalued but also by
not maintaining the norms of society. Thus, a fear arises of being negatively perceived through
the scope of conventional ideals, creating an oppressive force that limits difference. The
protagonist of “The Tiger’s Bride” is aware of the patriarchal power that objectifies her beauty
and her body into a commodity; she reflects upon the restrictions that societal and religious
norms create based on her determined role as a female; this role alienates her by cutting her off
from interrelationships that exist outside of the normative lifestyle. The protagonist’s reflections
on such norms will be analyzed in greater detail later in this paper. The feminine role Carter
creates for the protagonist resembles Butler’s perception of gender in relation to norms: “‘Sex’
is, thus, not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of the
norms by which the ‘one’ becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the
domain of cultural intelligibility” (Bodies that Matter 2). In this manner, Carter’s protagonist is
caged in a role that restricts her movement as an individual and, according to Susan Sellers in
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“New Myths or Old?: Angela Carter’s Mirrors and Mothers,” creates a “destructive definition of
woman” (118). This destructive categorization is based on social norms that place value on
essentialist definitions, such as feminine surface beauty and virginity. These systems objectify
women and destroy the fluidity of self. Similarly, these societal restrictions apply to the natural
world. There is a clear association between the female and nature that serves to devalue both
negatively. Twine presents this, stating that agency is “confined to the master’s sphere and a
marked fixidity [is] projected onto the devalued sphere of nature, women, and the body” (37).
Carter rejects this inflexibility and hierarchal sense of value in “The Tiger’s Bride” through the
protagonist’s subversive transformation, whereby she gains a sense of agency open to alterity
and reflective of the idea that “Pleasure lies in the unfixing of identity, in the recognition of its
fluidity” (Crunelle-Vanrigh 127).

I. Hierarchal Restrictions of Value in Notions of Beauty, the Body, and Animality
In order to understand the protagonist’s transformation in “The Tiger’s Bride” as
subversive, one has to analyze the hierarchal restrictions that surround and thus alienate her both
internally and externally. Importantly, Carter’s “Beauty” remains unnamed, though Carter does
mention nicknames her nurse gave her, such as “my beauty” or “Christmas rose” (Carter 167).
The unnamed narrator has at least three implications within this story: it suggests a lack of
identity, a freedom from identification, and it (ironically) subverts the notion of beauty in
patriarchal culture. In terms of lacking an identity, the protagonist’s isolation that prevents
relationships could suggest why she does not reveal her name. While lacking a name suggests a
removal of human individuality, it also can be analyzed as an opportunity for selfidentification—of finding a new identity based on interconnections rather than being born,
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named, and placed into a value system. Interestingly, this can be connected to Derrida’s analysis
of the term “animal”: “The animal is a word, it is an appellation that men have instituted, a name
they have given themselves the right and the authority to give to another living creature” (392).
In many ways, such categorization can also apply to the term the “woman” as a monolithic
category, just as racial stereotyping becomes prominent in labels such as the Asian, the Black,
and the Hispanic. The protagonist’s status as an unnamed “woman” suggests the patriarchal
restrictions that exist around her in “The Tiger’s Bride.” In “Exploring the Boundaries:
Feminism, Animals, and Science,” Lynda Birke builds on this idea: “Whatever notion of
‘animal’ we use, it is always a construction (just as ‘woman’ is a construction). Historically,
ideas about animals and their role(s) in relation to (Western) society have inevitably changed as
the needs and priorities of human society have changed” (42). Furthermore, the categorization of
species through names can be linked to naming someone “Beauty.” The name itself suggests the
commodification of the feminine in a way that distorts and limits what is deemed beautiful; this
commodification is clearly seen in de Beaumont’s traditional telling of “Beauty and the Beast,”
where the woman is beautiful and the Beast is ugly (de Beaumont 137). Similarly, “The Beast”
(like the protagonist) is also categorically labeled as animalistic instead of having a personal
name that individualizes him. The title “Beauty and the Beast” therefore creates a binary
between the lovely female and the ugly, bestial male.
Categorizing beauty with the feminine and ugliness with the masculine also draws upon
the conventional “civilizing” effects feminine beauty has on “uncontrolled” masculine sexuality.
In The Uses of Enchantment, Bruno Bettelheim analyzes this distinction in gender, remarking
how in most Western fairy tales, “the beast is male and can be disenchanted only by the love of a
female…[allegorically] it is the female who has to overcome her view of sex as loathsome and
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animal-like” (285). Such a viewpoint points back to de Beaumont’s version that ends with a
conventional, heterosexual marriage, fitting into the idea that sex only loses its aggressive,
masculine animality through marriage (Bettelheim 309). The “taming” of masculine sexuality is
exemplified through the transformation of the beast into not just a human, but “one of the
loveliest of princes her eyes ever beheld” (de Beaumont 146). Carter questions both the sexual
traits of gender and also the domestication of sex through marriage in her title, “The Tiger’s
Bride.” Through this title, Carter takes the animalization of sex to a level that plays upon the
fear of the uncontrollable and toys with the notions of conventional marriage and gender. The
protagonist is deemed the “bride” of the tiger only in the title, and the union that occurs is one of
the self embracing the “animalistic” other through the rejection of normative patterns, including
official marriage rites. Furthermore, it can be suggested that this title creates a “marriage”
between humans and animals in a manner that shows the potential for co-existence. “The Tiger’s
Bride” takes this traditional tale and reinterprets sexuality in a manner that “begins to dismantle
the phallocentric underpinnings of both sex and language” (Lau 92) by questioning the limiting
nature of phallocentric constructions—namely, its rejection of female sexuality, animal or
otherwise, which will be analyzed throughout this chapter.
The value patriarchal society places on surface beauty that serves to objectify and
degrade the female into physical terms is also integrated in “The Tiger’s Bride.” Naomi Wolf
studies this objectification by analyzing how society commodifies beauty in The Beauty Myth:
How Images of Beauty are used Against Women. Wolf states,
Beauty is a currency system like the gold standard…In assigning value to women in a
vertical hierarchy according to a culturally imposed physical standard, it is an expression
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of power relations in which women must unnaturally compete for resources that men
have appropriated for themselves. (12)
In other words, beauty relates to cultural definitions, economics, and patriarchal value systems
based on external looks. The protagonist analyzes the value of beauty in “The Tiger’s Bride”
when she considers the childhood tale her nursemaids told her about the waggoner’s lass: “the
waggoner’s lass, hare-lipped, squint-eyed, ugly as sin, who would have taken her?” (Carter 158).
Lacking beauty, the waggoner’s lass therefore lacks value in the nursemaids’ eyes and, according
to them, men’s eyes. In the society Carter creates, where females depend on the patriarchy to
materially survive, being defined as ugly suggests an inability to obtain those material goods for
want of a husband. Twine expands upon this notion of value based on beauty: “Aesthetic
markings not only devalue many bodies, but also provides a significant source of profit” (47).
The profit exists in the products used to make a woman “more beautiful,” such as cosmetics.
Beauty in this manner becomes generalized in terms of the conventions and norms of a given
society, lacking the diversity and difference that exists in the aesthetic experience.
The notion of beauty and ugliness becomes negatively associated with the animal realm.
The tale of the waggoner’s lass continues with the woman getting pregnant: “to her shame, her
belly swelled amid the cruel mockery of the ostlers and her son was born of a bear, they
whispered. Born with a full pelt and teeth; that proved it” (Carter 158-59). Consequently,
ugliness becomes associated with the beastly. The waggoner’s lass lacks conventional beauty
and thus is “perceived as occupying an ambiguous space between humanity and animality”
(Twine 44). She exists in the abject realm of the other, having a child “born of a bear,” which
crosses the taboo boundaries that separate the human and the animal. This tale, created out of
gossip, contains the fear of being associated with the animal and suggests that a lack of beauty
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diminishes the value of the female. However, in remaining unattached to the name Beauty, the
protagonist has the ability to see beauty as a face value and not be entirely defined by it; this
aloofness allows her to move away from defining entities in terms of conventional human
beauty.
The value of beauty created by society can be connected further to the objectification of
the female body. In “The Tiger’s Bride,” the protagonist is clearly being objectified—she
becomes a piece of property her father loses at cards. In fact, the property value of the
protagonist starts the story off with the following line: “My father lost me to The Beast at cards”
(Carter 154). In The Sexual Politics of Meat, Carol Adams defines objectification in the
following manner: “Objectification permits an oppressor to view another being as an object. The
oppressor then violates this being by object-like treatment” (73). The protagonist recognizes her
position as an object throughout the story, and her tone clearly reflects the bitterness of this
position: “You must not think my father valued me at less than a king’s ransom; but at no more
than a king’s ransom” (Carter 156). Note the term “value” is used here and not the term “love,”
showing the strained relationship between father and daughter. The protagonist’s voice clearly
reflects her bitterness of the situation and what she thinks of her father: “I watched with the
furious cynicism peculiar to women whom circumstances force mutely to witness folly, while
my father, fired in his desperation by more and yet more draughts of firewater they call ‘grappa’,
rids himself of the last scraps of my inheritance” (Carter 154). This quotation also shows her
restricted position in society that prevents her from having the power to make her father stop.
She must passively watch while her father loses her wealth. When she finds herself reduced to a
prize, she meditates “on the nature of [her] own state, how [she] had been bought and sold,
passed from hand to hand” (Carter 165). Furthermore, when her father says goodbye to her, he
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asks for a rose to show that she forgives him. As a gesture of protest, the protagonist “break[s]
off the stem, [and] [she] prick[s] [her] finger…so he gets his rose all smeared with blood”
(Carter 158). The rose does not symbolize forgiveness but rather is a reminder that the “object”
he has just lost is alive, human, and yet unable to make choices. It also reflects ways in which
the father has made his daughter subject to violence by giving her to The Beast; the protagonist
tries to co-opt this violence for her own purposes, seen through pricking her finger on the thorn.
Furthermore, using the rose in this manner (that shows disappointment and even hatred) radically
changes its meaning in de Beaumont’s version in which the rose symbolized the undying love
between father and daughter (Bettelheim 284).
The protagonist’s body is further objectified through the value placed upon virginity.
Such a focus on virginity traces back to de Beaumont’s version, where the Prince states, “a
wicked fairy condemned me to remain under that shape [the beastly shape] till a beautiful virgin
should consent to marry me” (146). “The Tiger’s Bride” utilizes this focus on virginity but in a
manner that reflects on the issues of the masculine gaze. What The Beast wants is told to the
protagonist by his valet: “My master’s sole desire is to see the pretty young lady unclothed nude
without her dress and that only for the one time after which she will be returned to her father”
(Carter 160). Through this emphasis on seeing, Carter reflects upon the patriarchal power of the
gaze that objectifies the female body. Such a pornographic request from The Beast, an animal
attempting to be human, suggests the problem with trying to gain subjectivity at the cost of
objectifying another. Furthermore, such a request connects to Gilson’s comment that
“consuming pornography can be a way of avoiding one’s own vulnerability by supplanting
feelings of powerlessness with those of control, however illusory” (170). In this sense, The
Beast’s longing for power and humanity leads him to believe he needs to objectify the
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protagonist to copy his human counterparts. It is also important to note that in the above
quotation the valet is referring to the protagonist in third person, even though he is speaking
directly to her. The use of “her” instead of “you” further objectifies the protagonist by
distancing the action that she will have to do to avoid awkwardness for the speaker. The Beast’s
request is furthered by his desire to see the body of a young woman that has never been seen by a
man before (Carter 163). In response to these requests, the protagonist thinks, “I was a young
girl, a virgin, and therefore men denied me rationality just as they denied it to all those who were
not exactly like themselves, in all their unreason” (Carter 165). The false, dualistic notion of
man as rational and woman as irrational is touched upon here—the protagonist sees men as
irrational, especially her father. In her statement, she also recognizes that her gender is not the
only “othered” subjectivity to be oppressed by men.
Just as the protagonist is denied a mind because of her gender, animals too are denied,
largely based on their inability to communicate (or the failure of humans to recognize that
animals do “communicate” in non-verbal ways). In The Eye of the Crocodile, Val Plumwood
analyzes rationalist, hierarchal models of control, stating,
Rationalist models which treat communication as an exercise in pure, abstract, neutral
and universal reason, and which delegitimate the more emotional and bodily forms of
communication, operate to exclude non-humans from full communicative status just as
they exclude various human others. (65)
These rationalist models look at rationality in terms of who has a voice. Because the narrator
finds herself in the realm of the irrational, her power for communicating is diminished by her
sex. She must find a new means of communication, one that does not involve words, to find
power to stand against the patriarchal society that removes her voice and other voices from the
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picture in an attempt to maintain boundaries. Furthermore, Butler argues, “The body that is
reason dematerializes the bodies that may not properly stand for reason…one which requires that
women and slaves, children and animals be the body, perform the bodily functions, that it [the
rational man] will not perform” (Bodies that Matter 49). Therefore, the rational and idealized
man, while impossible to uphold, perceives the body as negative and rejects it into the realm of
the irrational where women and animals also find themselves placed.
The protagonist’s response to the initial request of removing her clothes gives her agency
and a voice that allows her to regain some control over her body. The protagonist laughs and
lays out her own much more detailed terms:
You put me in a windowless room, sir, and I promise you I will pull my skirt up to my
waist, ready for you. But there must be a sheet over my face, to hide it…If you wish to
give me money…you should give me only the same amount of money that you would
give to any other woman in such circumstances. (Carter 161)
Day argues that by placing herself exactly in the realm of the objectified object, she is “asserting
her own knowledge of the codes of masculine objectification of the female, as if she is saying: ‘If
I’m going to be an object, then I’m really going to be one’” (141). Day’s comment takes notice
of the protagonist’s awareness that the degrading request will take away her subjectivity;
therefore, she will only do the request if they put “a sheet over [her] face,” and really make her
an object rather than making it seem like removing her clothes is a small request. Furthermore,
her statement about being paid for her services places her in the situation the valet attempts to
skirt around, the position of herself as a whore or pornographic image. Similarly, she also
wishes that “[she] had rolled in the hay with every lad on my father’s farm, to disqualify [herself]
from this humiliating bargain” (Carter 163). She sees the degradations of this objectification and
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rejects the notion of her body as a commodity by denying The Beast her body until it is her
decision to do so. The protagonist sees that “[her] own skin was [her] sole capital in the
[patriarchal] world” (Carter 159), and therefore will not let those around her control it. It is also
worth noting that the protagonist has a voice (through first person narration) that allows her to
reflect upon everything occurring to her. The protagonist has the ability to present the
ridiculousness of the situation she finds herself in—indeed, she laughs at The Beast’s request—
further degrading the power of the masculine gaze. Her viewpoint on the situation as ridiculous
also suggests that the masculine need for such power over the gaze stems from discomfort in the
man’s own self. In giving her protagonist a voice, Carter begins to transfer where the power is
positioned as the protagonist rationally questions the patriarchal dualisms that place her into an
objectified, irrational status.
The role of the clockwork maid further reflects the subordination of the protagonist by
society. The clockwork maid is described by the protagonist in the following manner: “a
marvelous machine, the most delicately balanced system of cords and pulleys in the world…This
clockwork twin of mine halted before me…she raises her arm and busily dusts my cheek with
pink, powdered chalk that makes me cough, then thrusts towards me her little mirror” (Carter
162). Again, the value of beauty is presented in the clockwork maid’s role—that of applying
blush and holding a mirror. Furthermore, the clockwork maid is created in the protagonist’s
image, which Sellers takes note of, stating, “The clock-work maid ‘The Beast’ sends to tend her
is initially described as her ‘twin’ since it so exactly mimics the mechanical obedience she has
been required to display” (118). The fact that the protagonist associates herself with a machine
created and controlled by society connects to the idea of Platonism mentioned earlier in this
chapter: “Platonism thus grounds…the domain of representation filled by iconic copies defined
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not by an extrinsic relation to the object, but rather by an intrinsic relation to the model or
ground. The Platonic model is sameness” (Deleuze 50). The clockwork maid is an iconic image
of the protagonist, and the protagonist perceives herself as the image of a society that forms
borders to maintain normativity. Sameness thus diminishes the differences of individuals and
rejects interrelationships that attempt to destabilize that monotony. The protagonist furthers this
idea when she asks the following question: “The clockwork girl who had powdered my cheeks
for me; had I not been allotted only the same kind of imitative life amongst men that the dollmaker had given her?” (Carter 165) The protagonist recognizes that lives a life created by the
patriarchal system and recognizes herself as a doll in that system, one whose identity is attached
to the makeup and the mirror that the clockwork maid wields. Hence, she conceives the
“imitative” life she leads, isolated by her “loving” father and the society that marks her as
inferior both rationally and physically.
The protagonist’s observations of The Beast build on the notions of value, commodity,
and conformity that create boundaries of sameness and shows how the animal, like the female,
experiences subordination in defined human structures. Known in society as The Beast, his
name itself connects to the animal realm and shows how humans seek to separate the human
from the animal “in order to identify themselves” (Derrida 400) as not animal. This
categorization places The Beast unquestionably outside of humanity while he attempts to exist
within the human realm by superficially conforming to its norms—he gambles, dresses in human
clothing, has a wig, and wears a mask. The protagonist especially notes the painted human
mask, stating, “Oh yes, a beautiful face; but one with too much formal symmetry of feature to be
entirely human: one profile of his mask is the mirror image of the other, too perfect, uncanny”
(Carter 156). This quotation appears to reference William Blake’s concept of “fearful
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symmetry” (Blake 129) in his poem “The Tyger” by representing the mask’s symmetry as “too
perfect” and therefore disconcerting. This discomfort in the perfection of The Beast’s painted
face portrays the existence of an “abject” symmetry between the self and the other or the Lamb
(the innocent) and the Tyger (the dangerous predator). The Beast tries to cover up his animality
(his otherness) with a mask, but it still remains in existence just beneath a surface too flawless to
be real. Furthermore, the unease the protagonist feels as she looks at the mask seems to suggest
the issue with a psychology that seeks to define “humanity” as an identity purged of any
association with the animal (or with the other). Doing so leads to a fundamentally dishonest
repression that goes into the creation of (so-called) ideal human “perfection.” The human mask
therefore reflects how unnatural such an ideal can be.
Through his attempts to conform, The Beast tries unsuccessfully to be recognized as a
“superior” human. He fails to do so because of his animalistic qualities and inability to speak.
Even the heavy perfume he wears cannot mask his otherness that keeps him outside of human
definition (Carter 155). The protagonist notes, “he [The Beast] has an odd air of self-imposed
restraint, as if fighting a battle with himself to remain upright when he would far rather drop on
all fours. He throws our human aspirations to the godlike sadly awry” (Carter 156). This
quotation shows how the protagonist rejects The Beast’s wish to be integrated because she does
not place humanity in the superior realm. Also, the Beast’s battle to stand on two legs shows
how he goes against his natural inclinations in his effort to reflect “ideal” humanity. The Beast’s
attempt to conform connects to what Grosz discusses as the problem of recognition within an
oppressive symbolic order:
The subject seeks to be known and to be recognized, but only through its reliance on
others, including the very others who function to collectively subjugate the subject…if
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the subject strives to be recognized as a subject of value in a culture which does not value
that subject in the terms it seeks, what is such recognition worth? (84)
The Beast wants to be valued through the humanist ideal, hence his attempts to appear human
under the masquerade of clothes, masks, and scents. Yet as his socially given name shows, The
Beast does not obtain the definition he seeks and therefore remains in the realm of the other.
This otherness is further developed by The Beast’s inability to speak for himself: “He has such a
growling impediment in his speech that only his valet, who understands him, can interpret for
him, as if his master were the clumsy doll and he the ventriloquist” (Carter 156). The restriction
of a spoken language, a category that places animals in an inferior status compared to humans,
causes The Beast to lose power and become a “clumsy doll” (Pollock 36), similar to the
imitative, doll-like life of the clockwork maid. This inability to speak the human language
connects to what Stibbe addresses: “It is in the manufacturing of consent within the human
population for the oppression and exploitation of animals that language plays a role” (20). In
other words, the inability of animals to use human language allows an opening for humans to
devalue, restrict, and utilize them for extrinsic purposes. The Beast’s unsuccessful attempt to
mimic humanity makes him “two-dimensional” in the protagonist’s eyes (Carter 155) and takes
away his uniqueness, placing his otherness in an inferior position.
Through his attempts to gain value by being perceived as a human, The Beast becomes a
representation of a type of reverse anthromorphism. Carter swaps the roles by presenting an
animal attempting to gain human characteristics rather than a person giving the animal
humanistic qualities; such an attempt to gain human characteristics is presented as restrictive
rather than liberating. Anthromorphism in animal rights can be perceived as both positive and
negative. One perspective is that by giving animals human traits, they are added to the
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“negotiation of value among humans’” (Mullen 215), thus placing greater value on animals by
the human perspective. Others argue that attributing human characteristics to animals in order to
expand their value is based on sentimental connections and limits the animal to the terms of
human subjectivity (Economides). Similarly, even giving inherent value to other entities loses
strength because such value is identified by humanity while others may remain excluded. The
Beast, in his human camouflage, represents how attributing human characteristics to animals can
devalue the animal by taking away what the animal truly embodies. Pollock states, “Carter
returns over and over again to the notion that, like race, class, and gender, animal nature is a
human construct” (40). This anthropocentric construction of animal nature can position the
animal in a negative role, presented by the initial doll-like imagery of The Beast. His character
exists in a restrictive state of anthromorphic projection. Lynda Birke suggests in “Unnamed
Animals: How Can Thinking about ‘Animals’ Matter to Feminist Theorizing?” that the exclusion
of non-humans “[remove] us from biology, which [leaves] us inarticulate not only about other
species in our worlds, but also about how to think about the biological body” (149). Thus, the
human body becomes isolated within definitions and values solely based on humanist ideals.
The distinct constructions of animal nature and human nature create an absolute boundary
between the human and the animal that fails to recognize how these two natures are actually
interconnected within the self: “What is the ‘animal nature’ that they [animals] allegedly
have…Each species, including ourselves, is more or less adapted to the environment in which it
finds itself: and each is different. Humans are indeed unique, but so are dogs, ostriches, and
parrots, or anything else” (Birke, “Exploring the Boundaries” 38). In many ways, these
constructions feed upon the fear of the other on an external and internal level; the other exists in
order for the majority to be defined, valued, and safe within boundaries that uphold notions of
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sameness. Reenee Askins furthers this idea in “Shades of Grey,” stating, “We are a nation that
longs for things to be black and white. We do not like ambiguity. We do not like the uncertain,
the unpredictable, [or] the uncontrollable. We like secure borders” (376). Crossing such
boundaries can bring a terror of the unknown, as “The Tiger’s Bride” represents with the tale of
the waggoner’s lass as well as the following example give by the protagonist: “The wondering
peasants once brought my father a skull with horns four inches long on either side of it and
would not go back to the field…until the priest went with them; for this skull had the jaw-bone
of a man, had it not?” (italics in original, Carter 159) In this case, order, through society and
religion, seeks to minimize the connection between the self and the other as well as the human
and the animal out of fear of finding similarities. But in creating such barriers, society rejects the
relationships that exist between all entities of life. Instead, it anthropocentrically projects
restrictive meaning upon the world and creates isolated identities.

II. Terrifying (Sexual) Devourment, Sadomasochism, and Acknowledging Subjectivity
The Beast’s role as a predatory animal portrays the fear related to carnivorous animality
and the connections between the male/female, predator/prey, and aggressor/victim binaries.
Following my analysis concerning ways in which predatory identity is sexualized in “The
Tiger’s Bride” will be a discussion regarding how and why Carter’s fairy tales are critiqued for
being sadomasochistic in nature. In Carter’s fairy tale, the protagonist relays the terror of being
consumed, stating, “My English nurse once told me about a tiger-man she saw in London…to
scare me into good behavior….If you don’t stop plaguing the nursemaids, my beauty, the tigerman will come and take you away….Yes, my beauty! GOBBLE YOU UP!” (Carter 158) This
passage shows a predator and prey relationship that exists between men and women in
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patriarchal culture as well as the human fear of being recognized as food. It also relates to de
Beaumont’s original tale, where Beauty “firmly believed Beast would eat her up that night” (de
Beaumont 142). Pollock reflects on Carter’s own statement on how the “treatment of animals in
the West is not only philosophically flawed, but rooted in primitive emotions, especially fear:
humans are ‘shit-scared…of carnivores because, presumably, they would eat us’” (qtd. in
Pollock 40). Carter presents this fear in “The Tiger’s Bride” through the use of devourment as a
tool to scare children into obedience. Val Plumwood recognizes this fear of becoming food for
predators, stating, “Horror movies and stories also reflect this deep-seated dread of becoming
food for other forms of life: Horror in the wormy corpse, vampires sucking blood, and alien
monsters eating humans” (“Prey to a Crocodile”).
The terror of being eaten drives many of Carter’s stories, but she also derails it through a
sexual lens that initiates a different type of dread. While the nurse’s tale suggests the horror of
being prey, the nurse continues to scare the protagonist by further describing the tiger-man, who
bears little resemblance to a human as “his hinder parts [are] all hairy” (Carter 158). Again,
there is this morphing of man and animal that ignites fear within the human. This passage also
suggests how predation is often sexualized in our culture by bringing up the tiger-man’s “hinder
parts.” Accordingly, the notion of being gobbled up has sexual connotations, animalistic in
nature, which the protagonist reflects on near the end of the story: “Nursery fears made flesh and
sinew; earliest and most archaic of fears, fear of devourment. The beast and his carnivorous bed
of bone and I, white, shaking, raw, approaching him as if offering, in myself, the key to a
peaceable kingdom in which his appetite need not be my extinction” (Carter 168). This
quotation assumes a predator and prey relationship that places the beast as the devourer on his
“carnivorous bed” and the protagonist “white, shaking, [and] raw” as the devoured. Like meat,
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she describes herself as “raw,” and the use of the color white connects to her status as a virgin.
The protagonist’s statement also suggests that “his appetite need not be my extinction,” bringing
to mind a sexual appetite rather than one based on eating. Carter utilizes this image to show the
fear of the other often established in (specifically) female children before deconstructing the
predator/prey and aggressor/victim binaries.
In connection to the fear that derives from the thought of being devoured, Merja Makinen
comments in “Angela Carter's ‘The Bloody Chamber’ and the Decolonization of Feminine
Sexuality,” that Carter’s use of beasts in her fairy tales can represent female desire as an appetite
that “women have been taught might devour them, but which, when embraced, gives them
power, strength, and a new awareness of both self and other” (10). Representing female
sexuality as powerful counters the “polarization of gender roles” where “women are positioned
as submissive, passive, powerless, acted upon, harmed objects, and men are positioned as
dominant, active, powerful, acting, harming subjects” (Gilson 157). Carter continuously studies
and warps these roles in her fairy tales. In particular, Carter’s “The Company of Wolves,” a
retelling of Perrault’s “Little Red Riding Hood,” reconsiders the devouring nature of the wolf by
giving Little Red agency when she “chooses to act upon her own animal drives” (Lau 88). The
power she gains by asserting her sexuality allows her to laugh at the wolf’s traditional response
of “All the better to eat you with” (Carter 219) because “she knew she was nobody’s meat”
(Carter 219). Rather, Carter’s story ends with Little Red sweetly sleeping “between the paws of
the tender wolf” (Carter 220), switching the role of “meat” from Little Red to the wolf by
describing him as “tender” (Makinen 11). This ending also challenges the morals of Charles
Perrault’s original tale of “Little Red Riding Hood,” the major one being the importance of being
cautious of the wolves (men) who seek to devour innocent young ladies (Perrault 26).
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Through her fairy tales, Carter challenges the traditional gender distinctions that uphold
the aggressor and victim binary that perpetually places the female in the role of victim; yet her
utilization of violence and use of this binary has led to criticism. As presented by “The
Company of Wolves,” Carter often reverses the roles of aggressor and victim, placing the female
in the role of the dominant, masculine gaze (Lau 86). Carter has been criticized for her use of
phallocentric violence as a tool for her female characters to gain power because (in some
assessments) this does not truly challenge the ethos of domination. To some critics, doing so
negatively involves her female characters negotiating sexual violence by embracing or returning
the aggressive masculine gaze in order not to become rape victims. It has been argued that such
phallocentric power supports sadomasochism and the dominator/dominated roles it produces
through violence. For example, in Carter’s “The Company of Wolves,” Little Red “laughed at
him [the wolf] full in the face, she ripped off his shirt for him and flung it into the fire, in the
fiery wake of her own discarded clothing” (Carter 219). This can be read as Little Red
aggressively accepting her fate and “since her fear did her no good, she ceased to be afraid”
(Carter 219).
In regards to the above criticism, I would argue that Carter’s fairy tales reach beyond
what some critics have classified as “a reproduction of male pornography” (Makinen 4). The
way Carter handles violence in her fairy tales is more complex than merely reversing gender
roles in the aggressor/victim binary and supporting phallocentric violence. Rather, there is a
constant exchange of gazes (of power) which attempts to get beyond the binaries that divide “the
world cleanly into victims and perpetrators, sufferers and darers, or protectors and those in need
of protection” (Gilson 159). In doing so, Carter seems to recognize the futility of trying to define
complex sexual relationships dualistically and also the danger in “Identifying women’s bodies as
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inherently susceptible” to violence because it “naturalizes violence (as an inevitable outcome of
male aggression and female violability), prevents apprehension of male vulnerability, and
obscures the fundamentally ambiguous character of sexual vulnerability” (Gilson 153). Rather
than critiquing Carter’s use of sadomasochism as completely negative, Robin Sheets suggests in
“Pornography, Fairy Tales, and Feminism,” that Carter “urges women to challenge assumptions
about female masochism and to define a sexuality outside of dominant-submissive power
relations” (655). Makinen follows a similar line of critique by noting that though Carter’s use of
violence can be disturbing, her
strength is precisely in exploding the stereotypes of women as passive, demure, cyphers.
That she therefore evokes the gamut of violence and perversity is certainly troubling, but
to deny their existence is surely to incarcerate women back within a partial, sanitized
image only slightly less constricted than the Victorian angel in the house. (9)
Carter is not afraid to utilize the marginalized, the dark, or the abject and she does so to study all
angles of human nature and sexuality, even those censored from the surface. Fear of the abject
exists for the very reason that it is unknown and yet exceptionally close; no one can deny that
sometimes the abject contains things that one would prefer to leave hidden, particularly what
would be considered a darkness inside the self (Kristeva 1). Carter may not necessarily condone
sadomasochism but she recognizes the “polymorphous potentialities of female desire” (Makinen
14), and she presents these different desires (and relationships) in her writing (Makinen 12).
Doing so brings to the surface the ambiguity of sexual relationships and suggests a truth in
Gilson’s statement, “if the aim is to alter a misogynistic and moralistic status quo, then refraining
from giving expression to the intertwining of sex and subordination, power and pleasure,
submission and dominance, and violence and vulnerability seems akin to burying one’s head in
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the sand” (161). In other words, denial of such relationships fails to present the whole picture,
and Carter recognizes and shows these different relationships; she does so not necessarily
seeking to say what is positive or negative, but rather what exists—what needs to be
acknowledged.
Building up to the transformation of the isolated female identity, it is interesting to note
that Carter’s male protagonists must also experience fear and vulnerability along with their
transforming female counterparts. Such an occurrence in Carter’s fairy tales is not unusual, an
example being in “The Company of Wolves” where the devouring wolf is placed in a position of
fear: “She [Little Red] will lay his fearful head on her lap and she will pick out the lice from his
pelt” (Carter 219). In “The Tiger’s Bride,” the vulnerability that fear creates is often perceived
as negative and best to be avoided since “fear of our embodied being manifests in the abjection
of those others who remind us of these dimensions of ourselves” (Gilson 90). In other words, to
evade a loss of identity (often entailed in bodily vulnerability) and a sense of weakness, the
“other” is placed into the realm of the abject. However, Gilson suggests the following:
“vulnerability is an openness to alteration and to being affected in ways that cause such
alteration. Understanding oneself as vulnerable therefore involves an understanding of the self
as being shaped through its relationships to others, its world, and environs” (86). This sense of
vulnerability provides a new means of discerning identity. Blurred boundaries open up new
relationships that can exist without the need to dominate the vulnerable or seek to be
invulnerable as a form of power (Gilson 143). It is important to note that such vulnerability,
which Gilson identifies as positive vulnerability, does not erase the negative use of vulnerability
nor the historical violence females and animals have particularly been subjected to due to their
“othered” status (Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy 28). Carter’s use of vulnerability in “The
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Tiger’s Bride” presents both negative and positive vulnerability, the positive primarily appearing
in the relationship between the protagonist and The Beast at the end of the story. In studying the
connection between humans and animals, Birke suggests, “what can be learned is to question not
only boundaries of difference within humans (or between women), but also to question the
boundaries of what constitutes humanness” (“Exploring the Boundaries” 49). Questioning what
it means to be human breaks open the realm of the feared other—in order to face the abject, one
must be susceptible to various ways of viewing the other beyond a dominant lens.
The protagonist in “The Tiger’s Bride” works up to this acceptance of vulnerability and
fear, ultimately leading to her transformation into a relational self. She starts by recognizing the
similarities that exist, not necessarily between herself and the animal but the boundaries that they
are both restricted by in a social and religious sense. The protagonist notes these similar
restrictions as she rides out on a horse with the valet (a type of simian) and The Beast; she states
that none of them “could boast amongst us…one soul, either, since all the best religions in the
world state categorically that not beasts nor women were equipped with the flimsy, insubstantial
things when the good Lord opened the great Eden and let Eve and her familiars tumble out”
(Carter 165). This point suggests that the animals in “The Tiger’s Bride” are more than just
symbols of suppressed female desires that Makinen suggests (10). Rather, connections between
the social stigmatization of females and animals are addressed and analyzed. Through this
recognition of similar barriers, the narrator also notes the strangeness of her companions, namely
the valet and The Beast, and how that strangeness seems to be associated with her now as well.
She knows that her companions “[live] according to a different logic than [she] had done until
[her] father abandoned [her] to the wild beasts…This knowledge [gives] [her] a certain
fearfulness still: but…not much” (Carter 165). The “different logic” opens the protagonist up to
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viewing her position in the world differently (Day 142). Through the recognition of a logic
existing outside of the dominant hierarchy, the protagonist builds the foundation for a relational
rather than isolated self. This new type of logic is suggestive of Abram’s view on intelligence
existing outside of the human: “And the more I linger with this other entity, the more coherent
the relation becomes, and hence the more completely I find myself face-to-face with another
intelligence, another center of experience” (The Spell of the Sensuous 127). The protagonist
begins to expand on her own identity through her relationship with The Beast and the
surrounding environment.
The sense of strangeness and fear the protagonist feels in facing the unknown other is
amplified when The Beast decides to remove his clothes. Her response is one of terror: “My
composure deserted me; all at once I was on the brink of panic. I did not think that I could bear
the sight of him, whatever he was” (Carter 166). In this passage, the reader sees the terror of the
unknown—in removing his clothes and mask, the definitions the protagonist and society have
given The Beast will be wiped clean. Despite this terror, she does not refuse as she has done
when asked to remove her own clothes. In undressing, The Beast becomes the other, “How
subtle the muscles, how profound the tread. The annihilating vehemence of his eyes, like twin
suns. I felt myself ripped apart as if I suffered a marvelous wound” (Carter 166). The
protagonist’s experience with the other appears almost as an annihilation of the self. Such
annihilation draws upon violence as the protagonist describes the experience as being “ripped
apart” and suffering a “marvelous wound”—such terminology arguably can be perceived as
idealizing violence. Importantly, however, the self being demolished by gazing upon The Beast
is the mechanistic one created by society. This moment allows the narrator to perceive the true,
wonderful nature of another, rejecting surrounding boundaries and notions of conformity to
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embrace the true, non-restricted self; it is a self that holds more wonder and more potential for
creativity based on uniqueness and not sameness. The quotation above recognizes this wonder
by using the term “marvelous” in describing her experience and the “annihilating vehemence” in
the tiger’s eyes serves to acknowledge a power that has the capability of destroying boundaries.
This is exemplified when the protagonist thinks about the tigers she has seen before in
comparison to the one before her: this Beast is so different “…from the poor, shabby things I’d
seen once, in the Czar’s menagerie at Petersburg, the golden fruit of their eyes dimming,
withering in the far North of captivity. Nothing about him reminded me of humanity” (Carter
166). According to this quotation, the very power the other has for the protagonist is in the total
separation from humanity. In viewing the other as a unique entity, she rejects the human
construct in which animals “have been reviled, or sentimentalized or eroticized but seldom
known by us…We have become the boundary, the cage, the walls of captivity for all the rest”
(Hogan 17). Conversely, to escape the cage around the human (around herself) the protagonist
undresses as well and she feels “at liberty for the first time in [her] life” (Carter 166) by being
present and seen by something other. Day suggests that this stripping “does not place her as the
object of the masculine gaze. It incorporates into her subject position an animality which cultural
construction…has sought to mask” (143). At this point it could be argued that the masculine
gaze becomes neutralized—the protagonist views The Beast naked despite her terror and in
doing so she accepts the power of the gaze; however, her gaze does not objectify but rather
acknowledges the subjectivity of The Beast outside of his false, object-like humanity; this
acknowledgement (by implication) enables her to accept her own animal identity. She then
chooses to undress and gain the liberation of being viewed as a subject and unleashes her own
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passions. From this moment, the protagonist recognizes and seeks to form a relationship with
the other within and outside of herself.

III. The Transformation into a Relational Self and the Establishment of Equality
The protagonist’s subversion of her isolated identity allows her to experience a mental
and physical transformation into an interconnected being. Her identity therefore becomes one
based on multiplicity rather than an isolated self. The transformation allows the protagonist to
form an identity beyond societal restrictions. This conversion, sparked by the protagonist,
connects directly to Grosz’s idea of “making something, inventing something, which will enable
us to recognize ourselves, or more interestingly, to eschew recognition altogether” (84-5) instead
of waiting to be recognized and defined by a dominant society that hinders movement. Identity
thus becomes creative by its ever-changing indefiniteness. Furthermore, the protagonist’s
subversion through transformation reflects James Clifford’s ideas of viewing the relationship
between the self and the other in a nonviolent way in Predicament of Culture. David Moore
studies Clifford’s ideas in "Decolonializing Criticism: Reading Dialectics and Dialogics in
Native American Literatures," putting forth Clifford’s question:
Yet what if identity is conceived not as a boundary to be maintained but as a nexus of
relations and transactions actively engaging a subject…How do stories of contact,
resistance, and assimilation appear from the standpoint of groups in which exchange
rather than identity is the fundamental value to be sustained? (qtd. in Moore 9)
In this line of thought, the value of identity switches from the hierarchy of value that rejects
difference, and becomes connected to a multiplicity of relations, thus questioning the limitations
derived from separating the human from the other.
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The protagonist’s physical and mental transformations are intertwined, reflecting on how
the body and mind, often dualistically separated, exist together. Physically, she goes beyond the
social restrictions of the body by not returning to her father; instead, she strips off her clothes.
Her rejection of societal norms that limits her volatile body is seen in the clockwork maid.
Originally perceiving the maid as her twin, by the end of the narrative the protagonist is able to
conclude that the maid is “no longer the spit [image] of my own” (Carter 167), and decides to do
the following: “dress her in my own clothes, wind her up, and send her back to perform the part
of my father’s daughter” (Carter 167). This decision marks the change in thought the protagonist
has experienced and a blurring of boundaries occurs that allows her to explore herself in relation
to the world rather than being passively defined by the world. She rejects the copy of herself that
represents the limitations of a culture obsessed with sameness. Moreover, the protagonist
describes how the clockwork maid looks at her as she strips herself naked, stating,
the smiling girl stood poised in the oblivion of her balked simulation of life, watching me
peel down to the cold, white meat of contract and, if she did see me, then so much more
like the market place, where the eyes that watch you take no account of your
existence…And it seemed my entire life…had passed under the indifferent gaze of eyes
like hers. (Carter 168)
The indifference of the patriarchal gaze connects to a lack of care that hinders the formation of
meaningful relationships; within this gaze, the protagonist becomes the “meat of contract,” a
material good rather than a living being. The protagonist realizes that her alienation relates to
this indifference. Rather than being a mechanism acting out societal roles, the protagonist
embraces deeper connections that destabilize meaning and welcome a difference that
acknowledges the “incomplete forces at work within all the entities and events that can never be
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definitely identified” (Grosz 94). This new way of viewing the world that goes beyond surface
value and societal relationships also connects to Abram’s conversation about participation with
the natural world:
As we become conscious of the unseen depths that surround us, the inwardness or
interiority that we have come to associate with the personal psyche begins to be
encountered in the world at large: we feel ourselves enveloped, immersed, caught up
within the sensuous world. This breathing landscape is no longer just a passive backdrop
against which human history unfolds, but a potentized field of intelligence in which our
actions participate. (The Spell of the Sensuous 260)
By being open to multiple modes of being and recognizing the expanse of interconnections that
create a fluid self, the protagonist opens herself to this sensuous world; she allows herself to
interact with the so-called “abject” realm of the other.
The protagonist’s physical transformation does not occur without the notions of
vulnerability and pain. She changes into another version of herself, much like the becoming that
Grosz discusses, “becomings undo the stabilities of identity, knowledge, location, and being
and…elaborate new directions and new forces that emerge from these processes of
destabilization” (3). As the protagonist removes her clothes, she notes the pain that goes along
with it: “I felt as much atrocious pain as if I was stripping off my own underpelt” (Carter 168)
and “I was so unused to my own skin that to take off all my clothes involved a kind of flaying”
(Carter 168). While some critics argue that this moment objectifies the protagonist and
represents “‘the ritual disrobing of the willing victim of pornography’” (qtd. in Makinen 12), I
would disagree against this sentiment. Rather, the protagonist deconstructs herself in order to
reconstruct a self more in tune with other relationships beyond just the human. Through this
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painful process, she separates herself from the norms of society and thus is making herself, and
her body, vulnerable but not to male objectification in a pornographic setting. Instead, this
vulnerability allows her body to experience a change, one that opens her up to new forms of
communication in which the body is no longer something to be marked and valued by humanity.
The protagonist’s clothes, and eventually her skin, represent that shell of a mechanistic identity,
similar to the tiger’s abandoned clothes that are “The empty house of his appearance” (Carter
168). As she rejects her clothes, so does the rest of the house: the valet “reveal[s] himself, as…a
delicate creature, covered with silken moth-grey fur” (Carter 168); the fur coat she covers herself
with becomes “a pack of black squeaking rats that rattled immediately down the stairs” (Carter
168); and The Beast abandons his human visage, “pacing backwards and forwards, backwards
and forwards, the tip of his heavy tail twitching as he paced out the length and breadth of his
imprisonment between gnawed and bloody bones” (Carter 168). In such a manner, there is a
blurring and near disappearance of boundaries; the one that remains is the human structure of the
room that entraps The Beast.
The protagonist’s recognition that vulnerability and fear are important to establishing an
equal ground with The Beast becomes an essential part in the protagonist’s transformation and
deconstruction of boundaries. She experiences pain and embarrassment by stripping her clothes
and exhibits a fear of the predator. But she also recognizes that the beast “was far more
frightened of [herself] than [she] was of him” (Carter 169). The notion of becoming is
associated with the acceptance of vulnerability in relation to other beings. Gilson explains,
More specifically, a process of becoming occurs because of a connection between
something in oneself and something in the other being that draws one out of
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oneself…Accordingly, becoming is a process of transformation that exceeds the bounds
of activity/passivity dichotomy; it requires the kind of receptive openness. (139)
By allowing herself to be vulnerable in her nakedness, the protagonist acknowledges the
vulnerability in The Beast. This recognition allows her to interact with The Beast in an open
manner, connecting to Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of becoming that Economides reflects on:
“the subversive ‘symbiosis’ involved in this mutual experience of becoming-other cannot be
reduced to a feeling of pity, imitation or identification.” Thus, the transformation or recognition
of the fluidity of self that is occurring here involves a sense of equality between two entities that
exist within the realm of the ambiguous.
In opening up relations and facing the fear of difference, the relationship formed between
the protagonist and The Beast is one that destabilizes structure; this deconstruction is
exemplified when The Beast’s content purring begins to destroy his final entrapment: “The sweet
thunder of this purr shook the old walls, made the shutters batter the windows until they burst
apart and let in the light of the snowy moon…rocked the foundations of the house…I thought ‘It
will all fall, everything will disintegrate’” (Carter 169). This particular section, brought on by
the protagonist petting the tiger, presents the positive qualities associated with deconstruction.
Deleuze analyzes this positivity in the midst of destruction as it makes hierarchal notions
“impossible in relation to the idea of the order of participation, the fixity of distribution, and the
determination of value…Far from being a new foundation, it swallows up all foundations, it
assures universal collapse, but as a positive and joyous event, as de-founding” (53). Moreover,
the purring presents the care that exists between the protagonist and The Beast, as does The
Beast’s licking. The protagonist notes the sandpapery feel of the tongue that she recognizes will
lick off her skin. Again there is this notion of pain associated with the process of becoming, one
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less associated with sadomasochism and more with the difficulty of breaking away from
normative society. The protagonist states, “And each stroke of his tongue ripped off skin after
successive skin, all the skins of a life in the world, and left behind a nascent patina of shiny
hairs…my beautiful fur” (Carter 169). There is a clear transformation occurring here. Because
her fur is underneath her skin, the transformation is not external but rather internal—it is the
human skin, created by society, that hides the other self, reflecting Wolfe’s argument that “the
other-than-human resides at the very core of the human itself, not as the untouched, ethical
antidote to reason but as part of reason itself” (Animal Rites 17). The protagonist contains the
other and describes her new fur as beautiful, contrasting greatly with the conventional, surface
beauty discussed earlier and showing that beauty can also be associated with the beast.
The Beast similarly experiences liberation from the patriarchal structures of society. His
“imprisonment,” noted in the quotation above, exists due to the surrounding humanistic
structures in the form of the house. In this sense, though The Beast rejects his clothes and mask,
there remains a conventional structure that entraps the animal in the realm of the other—a
confinement of societal beliefs reflected by de Beaumont’s version when The Beast states, “I
know very well that I am a poor, silly, stupid creature” (143). The protagonist in “The Tiger’s
Bride” breaks down these conventions by meeting The Beast on an equal ground established by a
vulnerability that matches his own. This equality goes against de Beaumont’s negative portrayal
of animality where the Beast’s “animal nature is…revealed by his muteness, uncouthness, [and]
inability to meet Beauty as a social and intellectual equal” (Warner 299); this social issue is
solved when the Beast becomes a handsome prince as a reward for virtuous Beauty. In contrast,
“The Tiger’s Bride” does not place the human in the superior category. Rather, equality frees the
protagonist and The Beast from societal limitations and opens the way for positive encounters
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otherwise rejected. This mutual experience of liberation can be seen through The Beast’s
“purring” (noted above) that shows his pleasurable encounter with otherness and his acceptance
of the animal aspects of his identity. Such a positive interaction between The Beast and the
protagonist destroys the house that entraps both of them, making his “purring” a symbol of
pleasurable destruction of restrictions.
To further show that The Beast’s freedom from the patriarchy is on an equal level with
the protagonist in “The Tiger’s Bride,” it becomes important to note the tears The Beast sheds.
When the protagonist first refuses The Beast’s request that she remove her clothes, she notes
how The Beast cries: “A tear! A tear, I hoped, of shame. The tear trembled for a moment on an
edge of the painted bone [the mask], then tumbled down the painted cheek to fall, with an abrupt
tinkle, on the tiled floor” (Carter 161). The Beast’s liquid tears become a solid “pair of diamond
earrings of the finest water in the world” (Carter 163) and are gifted to Beauty—a gift that she
refuses to wear until the end of the narrative. Their transformation from liquid to solid form
suggests a movement away from fluid nature to defined structure; this is further exemplified
when the tears are given material value as jeweled earrings and are thus linked with the
commodification of female beauty that demands women adorn themselves (preferably with
expensive trinkets). The Beast’s sadness, made by his attempts to be human, is therefore
commodified. Furthermore, the solidified diamond tears reflect the frozen, “burned-out”
landscape (Carter 159) where The Beast chooses to live and the protagonist’s own feeling of her
life being “locked in ice” (Carter 157). The “diamond” tears and the frozen landscape both
convey a sense of entrapment in defined conventions. Hence, when The Beast’s “irreproachable
tears” (Carter 168) that the protagonist wears as earrings “turn back to water and trickle down
[her] shoulders” (Carter 169), a melting of structure is occurring similar to the breaking down of
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the house. The return to the fluid suggests a freedom of self that moves away from defined
human structures. In this sense, the falling tears can be perceived as tears of happiness rather
than entrapment; they no longer serve as material evidence of The Beast’s conformity and
surface materiality, becoming something deeper and ever-changing in nature.
With the tears, Carter also seems to be toying with de Beaumont’s use of water to awaken
the dying Beast as a form of purification that eventually leads to the Beast’s transformation (de
Beaumont 145). Rather than showing the motif of a cleansing “baptism” that offers a
“redemption from [the Beast’s] reduced, animal condition” (Warner 291), Carter represents the
transformation of the protagonist herself into an animal, following the path of the tears until she
“shrug[s] the drops off [her] beautiful fur” (Carter 169). In this manner, the rejection of
conventional virtues set by religion and society occurs, and the protagonist and The Beast both
experience liberation through their interconnection with one another. A new form of acceptance
develops, one that crosses the boundaries of the human-animal relationship in a manner that
reflects the human as an animal. This recognition opens the way to acknowledging “the life and
the body, and to affirm our solidarity with this physical form…acknowledge[ing] our existence
as one of earth’s animals, and so to remember and rejuvenate the organic basis of our thoughts
and our intelligence” (Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous 47).
The protagonist’s transformation allows readers to see the openness needed to develop
relationships that exist outside of boundaries and cultural constructions. The protagonist rejects
not so much humanity but those boundaries that separate the self from the other, the animal from
the human, and the female from the male. In this manner, a new way of being develops in which
the “body itself speaks” (Abram, Becoming Animal 167), and becomes open to a new mode of
communication that does not have to do with superior, disembodied humanity. It is a language
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that engages with others, that denies domination, and that tries to move beyond isolation that
would keep people, according to Deena Metzger in “Coming Home,” “from a web of intelligence
whose development and the extent we cannot even begin to imagine” (364). Creativity becomes
situated in difference and in being open to otherness, avoiding boundaries that attempt to
maintain sameness in order to evade discomfort. Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride” reflects how
“Each individual is an infinite multiplicity, and the whole of Nature is a multiplicity of perfectly
individuated multiplicities” (Deleuze and Guattari 254). Thus, the protagonist is not so much
changing completely into another entity as she is shedding a skin to replace it with a deeper,
multi-dimensional one, aware and open to the interconnections surrounding her. Furthermore,
these interconnections prevent the human from having “the right to name, to categorize, the rest
of the world but is now…enticed, to listen, to respond, to observe, to become attuned to a nature
it was always part of but had only aimed to master and control” (Grosz 24). Carter’s use of the
fairy tale genre and mythmaking allows the liberation of constricted identities by reflecting upon
and studying different types of relationships. She is undeterred by the abject and attempts to
present the ability of a non-destructive co-existence between the self and the other, the human
and the animal. In this manner, Carter progressively negotiates violence and power by studying
all angles and suggesting, especially in “The Tiger’s Bride,” the ability to create relationships
based on equality rather than domination. Hence, Carter’s fairy tales reflect the societal role of
folktales of the past by “respect[ing] our autonomy and leav[ing] the decisions of reality up to us
while at the same time they provoke us to think about the way we live” (Zipes, Breaking the
Magic Spell 22). “The Tiger’s Bride” and other stories by Carter suggest a new mode of being,
one that embraces vulnerability, faces fear, and opens an ever-changing existence that
disassociates from a defined, restricted self.
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Chapter Two
“Why talk when you are a word”: Human-Animal Relationships and (De)Mythologizing
Identities in Surfacing
Atwood’s 1972 novel, Surfacing, analyzes how an isolated individual can undergo
transformations that lead to an interconnected self. As a writer, Atwood crafts language to
develop a realm of uncertainty and instability, which becomes a promising ground for creativity
and metamorphosis. In “Power, Madness, and Gender Identity in Margaret Atwood’s
Surfacing,” Erinç Özdemir, states that her “writing, literary and otherwise, emerges…as a
subversive tool for women in trying to create a space for a feminine, ‘heterogeneous difference’
outside the static enclosure of the binary oppositions that underlie patriarchal ideology” (italics
in original 58). Similarly, Surfacing breaks through dualistic notions that separate body and
mind, humans and animals, men and women. The inventive use of language in Atwood’s writing
raises unanswerable questions and veils this novel in ambiguity. David Ward puts it well in his
article “Surfacing: Separation, Transition, Incorporation”: “Surfacing is a novel which both
invites and resists interpretation: its force is bound in with its indeterminacy” (95). Atwood’s
unnamed narrator experiences alienation due to social constructions and her own falsified
biography she uses to block out past trauma. Atwood creates an isolated self that questions the
boundaries that surround not only her but environmental entities as well, including animals. The
transformative experience the narrator undergoes allows her to escape an identity formed by lies
and restrictions in favor of a fluid self based on interconnections with the natural world. Her new
identity exists in ambiguity but listens and interacts with alternate forms of communication
beyond the human language. Unlike Carter, Atwood uses elements of the fairy tale genre to
focus primarily on the problems with censorship in relation to the narrator’s own mythmaking as
a form of escape. Furthermore, while Atwood presents creative aspects of mythmaking
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(particularly during the narrator’s transformation), she also shows how problems can arise via the
mythmaking process. Overall, Surfacing, through the use of ambiguity, explores the struggle of
an initially alienated narrator to establish an “interconnected” self, one that leads to the rejection
of prohibitive dualisms influenced by (patriarchal) language systems. However, this project is
not fully realized by the narrator because of her unconscious adherence to the misanthropic or
mythic belief that humanity is irrevocably violent.
Surfacing reflects on how human language, both spoken and written, creates hierarchal
limitations to communication and identification. The narrator feels constricted by language, seen
through her following statement: “Language divided us into fragments, I wanted to be whole”
(Atwood 147). The fragmentation of the narrator suggests her need for other forms of discourse
beyond the product of humanity (Spender 3). Language in its traditional anthropocentric sense
becomes situated in the realm of rationality and used as a means of creating boundaries,
particularly between humans and animals. Cary Wolfe develops this concept in Before the Law:
“Here, it is worth remembering that the capacity to ‘respond’ is quite obviously highly
contextual. It’s no surprise that we humans tend to be ‘best’ at it within the parameters of the
particular world that we’ve built for ourselves, with an eye very much to ourselves” (85). The
ability to respond is thus given to the privileged group that controls language; it becomes
restricted in itself and blind to other modes of communication. Hierarchal language creates
barriers in the forms of binaries and definitions, largely created out of what Stanley Cavelle
designates as a fear “that maybe language (and understanding, and knowledge) rests upon very
shaky foundations—a thin net over an abyss” (qtd. in Wolfe 47). In attempts to avoid instability
through the development of binaries, language, “far from being a liberating resource, becomes an
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instrument of control, of confinement” (Ward 99), especially for those whose voices are
restricted by the language and negatively associated with the animalistic, silenced realm.
Similar to Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride,” Surfacing exhibits how language, especially the
term “animal,” actively maintains the boundary between humans and animals. In particular,
Birke points out that the main problem “in thinking about ‘animals’ is the enormous difficulty of
escaping from a word, which does enormous cultural work in maintaining human
exceptionalism” (“Unnamed Others” 150). The word “animals” is challenging to get beyond
because it is heavily used in categorizing, creating, and upholding the human/animal binary.
Although the boundary of this dualism keeps moving as new ideas are formed about animals, the
fundamental drive to separate remains intact. Such dependence on language maintains barriers
that limit the formation of new communications and relationships, as Abram suggests in
Becoming Animal:
As humans, we rely upon a complex web of mostly discrete, spoken sounds to
accomplish our communication, and so it’s natural that we associate language with such
verbal intercourse. Unfortunately, this association has led many to assume that language
is an exclusive attribute of our species…and to conclude that all other organisms are
entirely bereft of meaningful speech. It is an exceedingly self-serving assumption. (167)
In this case, “language” not only shuts out other modes of communication (as suggested earlier)
but also limits who participates in the discourse. This ignorance to other forms of
communication (willful or otherwise) Abram terms “self-serving” because it supports dominance
and control rather than openness to difference. The dominant group can place value at will upon
beings unable to respond, promoting essentialist categorizations based on sameness.
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In Surfacing, the narrator wonders what response animals would give if they could speak,
stating, “what would they really say? Accusation, lament, an outcry of rage; but they had no
spokesman” (Atwood 131). Similarly, she brings up experiments done on children to test their
language ability: “depriving them [the children] of words, they [the doctors] found at a certain
age the mind is incapable of absorbing any language; but how could they tell the child hadn’t
invented one, unrecognizable to everyone but itself?” (Atwood 76). In these quotations and
several others throughout the novel, the narrator questions the dominant language of society and
the limitations it places on her and the surrounding environment. She finds herself incapable of
conforming to such restrictions, particularly when she encounters the term love: “It was the
language again, I couldn’t use it because it wasn’t mine. He [Joe] must have known what he
meant but it was an imprecise word; the Eskimos had fifty-two names for snow because it was
important to them, there ought to be as many for love” (Atwood 107). This statement is
interesting not just for the reflection on the limitations of words but also how they relate to
emotions; the narrator finds that words are not enough to express feelings, such as love, because
the definitions are too overarching to serve her individual feelings. Words in this sense are
products of a culture that impact the utilization of certain words. Particularly, Atwood’s narrator
studies the societal impact on language by looking at how words with the most negative
connotations are associated with the body: “the worst ones [words] in any language were what
they were most afraid of and in English it was the body” (Atwood 42). Here, the fear of the body
is reflected in the English language; it becomes important to understand this connection mainly
because the body itself can play a role in alternate forms of communication. Such associations
with fear and the body can prevent new discourses from developing. According to the narrator,
language restricts the body, and, “She [the narrator] is depicted as enacting a painful but
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determined search for another language, one that would allow non-destructive relationships with
others and nature” (Özdemir 58). Her attempt to find this new communication will be analyzed
later in this chapter.

I. Restrictive Languages: Naming, Fairy Tales, and Mythmaking
Developing her analysis on the limitations of language, the narrator finds herself rejecting
existing definitions and yet creating a myth that further alienates her from forming meaningful
relationships. The narrator’s namelessness throughout the novel can be connected to her
resistance to definitions. Gina Wisker suggests in Margaret Atwood: An Introduction to Critical
Views of Her Fiction, that the narrator’s undisclosed name presents “a link between naming,
language and the limitations imposed by civilization” (27-8). Spender also studies the power of
names, stating,
Names are essential for the construction of reality for without a name it is difficult to
accept the existence of an object, an event, a feeling. Naming is the means whereby we
attempt to order and structure the chaos.…By assigning names we impose a pattern and a
meaning which allows us to manipulate the world. (163)
In this sense, naming positions individuals or animals in a place of societal order, confining their
movements. This interpellation is also reflected in Butler’s analysis regarding how societal
norms constrict those placed in particular essentialist categories, particularly based on sex and
gender (Bodies that Matter 2). Furthermore, such naming is linked to Gregory Bateson’s
conversation about children learning about nouns in Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity: “They
are taught that a ‘noun’ is the ‘name of a person, place, or thing’…they are taught at a tender age
that the way to define something is by what it supposedly is in itself, not by its relation to other
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things” (17). By placing a name on any entity, it suggests that that entity is determined with no
consideration for the outside influences of others. Spender recognizes this in her own argument,
stating, “We are dependent on names but we are mistaken if we do not appreciate that they are
imperfect and often misleading” (163).
Just as names can be inaccurate, so can stories. In Surfacing, the narrator cuts out of her
life the loss she feels after the abortion of her child: “It was all real enough, it was enough reality
for ever, I couldn’t accept it, that mutilation, ruin I’d made, I needed a different version. I pieced
it together the best way I could, flattening it, scrapbook, collage, pasting over the wrong parts”
(Atwood 144-45). The story she creates protects her from the pain of losing the child. In her
tale, she is divorced (though she never married) and the baby is living with its father, a child the
narrator never identified as hers: “I didn’t name it before it was born even, the way you’re
supposed to. It was my husband’s, he imposed it on me, all the time it was growing in me I felt
like an incubator” (Atwood 30). She believes her own lie, becoming willfully ignorant of the
truth. Moreover, the narrator attempts to make herself invulnerable to such pain to protect
herself (Gilson 88). By doing so, she cuts herself off from relationships that could help her heal.
Gilson develops this idea, stating, “in seeking invulnerability we specifically ignore the
constitutive aspect of vulnerability, the way in which we become who we are through our
openness with others” (86-7). The narrator creates a lie to live by, one that she can accept and
control, a world that Plumwood suggests is “structured to sustain the concept of continuing,
narrative self; we remake the world in that way as our own, investing it with meaning,
reconceiving it as sane, survivable, amenable to hope and resolution” (“Prey to the Crocodile”).
Maintaining the story detaches the narrator; the lie holds her loosely together but prevents her
from substantial relationships and emotions.
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The cut off life of the narrator appears when she looks at old pictures of herself: “I was in
most of the pictures, shut in behind the paper; or not me but the missing part of me” (Atwood
108). These pictures reflect her alienation by suggesting the removal of significant parts. The
way she remembers the past is based solely on her own interpretation, and she lives in fear of
losing that meaning: “I have to be sure they’re my own and not the memories of other people
telling me what I felt, how I acted, what I said: if the events start inventing them and there will
be no way of correcting it” (Atwood 70). Thus, the myth becomes her lifeline to free her from
pain. In “Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing: Strange Familiarity,” Peter Quartermaine studies this
evasion in the title of this novel, commenting, “‘surfacing’ also describes that shared survival
instinct which looks only rarely beyond immediate specifics; we prefer self-reflections on a calm
surface to any glimpse of monsters beneath” (120). Quartermaine helps to understand why the
narrator grips her fabricated biography so intensely—she does not want to glimpse that
nightmarish past that mars and twists her into the monstrous.
Similarly, the fairy tale genre in Surfacing reflects on how some fairy tales dilute
gruesome ideologies in favor of superficial stories of childish fantasy. Interestingly, the
censorship used to hide the horrid in such tales directly connects to the narrator’s own fabricated
biography in the way she buries violent acts (like her abortion) into her unconsciousness. Irony
exists in how the narrator utilizes censorship but also critiques it, especially in her current job as
a fairy tale book illustrator. The fairy tale pictures the narrator creates do not fit in the
boundaries of society and are rejected by her publisher, Mr. Percival, who, “said one of my
drawings was too frightening and I said children liked being frightened. ‘It isn’t the children who
buy the books, he said, ‘it’s their parents’” (Atwood 50). Immediately, the notion of fear
becomes censored, picking and choosing what children do and do not see. This censorship is
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common in social media and representational of how the narrator is not the only one who
attempts to avoid fear and horror, especially since many original fairy tales were in fact
gruesome. Additionally, the narrator notes the complete avoidance of the body in the fairy tales,
stating, “they annoyed me, the stories never revealed the essential things about them [the
characters], such as what they ate or whether their towers had bathrooms, it was as though their
bodies were pure air” (Atwood 51). Her recognition that the body does not exist in these stories
exemplifies the distancing from the incontrollable and grotesque qualities that have historically
been associated with it. Whitewashing the body and violence from fairy tales relates to
Bettelheim’s definition of “optimistic meliorism,” in which, “The dominant culture wishes to
pretend, particularly where children are concerned, that the dark side of man does not exist” (8).
Atwood’s narrator is wary of this “optimistic meliorism” but also guilty of it herself when she
tries to efface or hide the violence in her own life. This conflicting position of critiquing and
utilizing censorship shows up in the narrator’s illustrations:
I wanted my third princess to be running lightly through a meadow but the paper’s too
wet, she gets out of control, sprouting an enormous rear…I give up and doodle, adding
fangs and a moustache, surrounding her with moons and fish and a wolf with bristling
hackles and a snarl; but that doesn’t work either, it’s more like an overweight collie.
(Atwood 54)
This passage reflects on the narrator’s inability to capture the expurgated versions of fairy tales
(and she fails to do so throughout the novel). The conventional princess will not form on the
page and becomes altered—she has both masculine (the mustache) and animal characteristics
(the fangs). Through the drawing, the princess takes on several identities that associate with the
narrator’s final transformation and her gravitation towards the animal. This passage also is
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symbolic of the narrator’s avoidance of the negative, reflected in the potentially violent wolf
becoming “an overweight collie.” Such a change from dangerous animal to spoiled pet reflects
on the narrator’s domestication of violence in her own life and her initial choice to see herself
situated in the position of victim with no power.
Through fairy tale imagery, Atwood also shows how the narrator sees violence as the
direct result of having power. The narrator finds rotten beans and imagines them as magical:
“Inside were pebbles, purple-black and frightening. I knew that if I could get some of them and
keep them for myself I would be all-powerful…if I’d turned out like the others with power I
would have been evil” (Atwood 33). Such a statement reflects on how women with power in
traditional tales became “evil” in the eyes of a patriarchal society where the virtues of women
were based on submission and gentility. The narrator rejects power because of her belief that all
power is frightening and malicious, an assumption stemming from her painful choices of the
past, such as the abortion of her child. In this manner, power holds a troubling role for the
narrator because she does not want it and yet still wields it through her dominant position as a
human. Atwood’s use of fairy tales in Surfacing, “reminds us of our own entrapment in patterns
of reading and belief” (Wisker 11) and of the need for extrication from such cycles in order to
recognize (and question) the surrounding structures. While the narrator fails to change the fairy
tales she illustrates, other modern women writers, such as Angela Carter, alter the very fabric of
fairy tales so that traditional meanings and morals are progressively transformed. Such
alterations (seen in Carter’s fairy tales) can also occur by returning to original tales and
uncovering the violence censored across generations and societies. Wilson remarks on how,
“Surfacing opposes the fragmenting force of fake, censored, and socially ‘sanitized’ fairy-tale
images to the paradoxically real power of the main embedded tales” (97), suggesting that
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Atwood recognizes how original tales that do not refrain from violence hold a power over stories
restricted in content for younger readers. In this case, the power does not exist in the violent acts
themselves, but in the ability to recognize violence and choose what to make of it. In her article,
“Don’t Tell Us What to Write,” Atwood discusses the censorship that plagues authors and social
media. Recognizing that while some censorship tries to protect those deemed innocent, she
states, “We want to know how bad things are, and whether they might affect us; but also we want
to make up our own minds. For if we don’t know the truth of the matter, how can we have any
valid opinions about it?” (Atwood 60) Likewise, fairy tales that attempt to shield do so at the
cost of a further understanding of what has been deemed grotesque (where violence and the body
are often positioned).
Similar to fairy tale censorship, Surfacing confronts the frontier myth and explores the
way it censors violence and forms boundaries. Masculine wilderness ideologies are social myths
that produce a problematic separation between wilderness and civilization. Drawing upon such
ideologies means taking part in mythologizing (and limiting perceptions of) wilderness. In
“Myth and Identity,” Jerome Bruner reflects on how myths interact with society and identity,
stating, “It is not simply society that patterns itself on the idealizing myths, but unconsciously it
is the individual …as well who is able to structure [his/her] internal clamor of identities in terms
of prevailing myth” (283). As such, myths, like censored fairy tales, reflect the time period and
the structured identity formation that can “establish barriers between groups by defining the lines
of separation” (Bajon 26). William Cronon’s “The Trouble with Wilderness,” helps put in
perspective idealizations of the wild, defining the “mythic frontier individualist” as “almost
always masculine in gender: here, in the wilderness, a man could be a real man, the rugged
individual he was meant to be before civilization sapped his energy and threatened his
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masculinity” (14). This position of the wilderness as masculine resonates in Surfacing in the
characters of David and Joe, city men entering what they perceive as the wilderness of Quebec, a
place to get away from the “femininizing tendencies of civilization” (Cronon 14). Notably, these
two men decide to create a documentary to capture aspects of the wild. In “Decapitation,
Cannibalism, and Rebirth in Surfacing,” Sharon Wilson correctly terms this video as “fakelore,”
stating, “Joe and David’s ‘folklore’ collection, ‘random samples,’ containing footage of a bottle
house, a stuffed moose, a ‘captured’ log, and a nude woman, comments on folklore snobbery and
cultural and gender imperialism…and a global twentieth-century wasteland as well as the
Canadian and U.S. ones” (109). Breaking down this catalog, the images included in their
documentary are all artificial in contrast to the wilderness image David and Joe seek to capture:
the moose is dead (as is a heron also presented in the video), the house is made of human waste,
the log is where they “took turns shooting each other [with a camera] standing beside it [the log],
arms folded and one foot on it as if it was a lion” (Atwood 81), and the woman is forced to strip
for the video. These images of domination remark upon the imperial nature of the documentary
and relate the objectification of the female to the destruction of the environment. Wilson’s
comment concerning “folklore snobbery” critiques the one-sided quality that comes with
capturing history, and is similar to the penning and moralizing of fairy tales that once existed in
an ever-changing oral tradition. David and Joe both project themselves upon the environment by
capturing in the camera lens what they believe it should contain. Cronon reflects upon such
projections on wilderness, stating, “As we gaze into the mirror it holds up for us, we too easily
imagine that what we behold is Nature when in fact we see the reflection of our own unexamined
longings and desires” (7). Thus, the ultimate destruction of the video by the narrator serves to
critique the artificiality of the enterprise. Along with their documentary, the two men want to
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learn how to catch and kill fish, nodding again to the idea of the masculine fantasy of enjoying
“the regeneration and renewal that [comes] from sleeping under the stars, participating in blood
sports, and living off the land” (Cronon 14-5). One of the major issues with the frontier myth is
that it does not take into account the actual violence that was inflicted upon the environment and
other native peoples when settlers first arrived/invaded new areas (Cronon 15). Such violence,
especially in terms of Canadian history, will be analyzed in further detail later in this chapter.
Both the delusional masculine wilderness fantasies and the censored fairy tales in
Surfacing reflect the world through a skewed lens; neither discourse maintains a connection with
its violent and terrifying origins, catering instead to fantasies of masculine empowerment and
childhood innocence. Such an omission of the abject disconnects one from reality and limits
perceptions into categories, often in the form of binaries. The narrator initially views her life
through such binaries, identifying with certain social constructs, such as rationality, beauty, and
gender. She attempts to avoid blurring any of the social boundaries because doing so would
produce uncertainty and draw her closer to what she has censored from her own life. She seeks
to preserve order to avoid the abject within herself, because the abject is “what disturbs identity,
system, [and] order. What does not respect borders, positions, [and] rules” (Kristeva 4). The
following section will analyze the narrator’s relationship with the value system and norms
produced by a restrictive society.

II. Personal and Societal Alienation of the Self
In Surfacing, the narrator experiences a patriarchal society that controls value systems,
makes power a mode of violence that instigates subordination, and uses human language as the
overarching weapon to dominate others. The environment and the treatment of animals as
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inferior exist at the forefront of the narrator’s observations about this restrictive society. Hence,
a large portion of this chapter will analyze the various comments the narrator makes about
animals and their relationship to humans. The value system reflects Warren’s ideas on how the
dominant group is self-privileged, a position that allows the group to control not just value but
the morality and justice associated with it: “representing the moral situation in a valuehierarchical way…conceals the fact that in contemporary society the point of view from the top
of the hierarchy functions as an invisible, unmarked, and privileged point of view” (Ecofeminist
Philosophy 107). In other words, the dominant group that defines value also deems what
“subjects” should be treated in an ethical manner. Animals, the environment, and “othered”
humans fall through the cracks of this justice system, opening the way to violence. Warren
continues to develop this idea by terming it as the “logic of domination,” which “assumes that
superiority justifies subordination. A logic of domination is offered as the moral stamp of
approval for subordination, since, if accepted, it provides justification for keeping the Downs
down” (Ecofeminist Philosophy 47). The use of such logic as a means of subjugation reduces the
power of the body and the emotions. Özdemir looks to this moral superiority in Surfacing and
notes how morality and rationality are closely connected since society “[justifies] its
transgressions against nature and human beings by the false ethic of rationality and logic, which
in turn constitutes the pillars of the humanistic belief in science and social progress” (59). Such
restrictions and potentially detrimental notions of value exist throughout Surfacing. In particular,
the narrator points to herself, animals, and the environment as bound by these notions of
patriarchal value largely presented in dualistic modes of thought.
Insofar as she internalizes this value system, the narrator identifies herself as a subject
defined by the rational/irrational binary, by surface-level beauty norms, and by commodified
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images of the female body even though she also finds fault with these ways of thinking. She
recognizes how in society she is categorized as a commercial artist, a position she went into
largely because of her art teacher, the man she was having an affair with: “for a while I was
going to be a real artist; he thought that was cute but misguided” (Atwood 49). Her relationship
with this man places her in a role of inferiority in which her creativity and individuality are
devalued. Furthermore, her past relationship with her art teacher impacts how the narrator
defines the worth of her current lover, Joe. She values him for his physical body and for his
failure as a potter. She lacks any emotional connection that may be considered love, stating,
“Perhaps it’s not only his body [she] like[s], perhaps it’s his failure; that also has a kind of
purity” (Atwood 54). The narrator placing value on his body serves to objectify the male;
placing value on his failure “makes him less self-assured, therefore less masculine, less
threatening, and more vulnerable” (Özdemir 73); the narrator therefore flips the position of being
devalued and used by becoming emotionally separated. Herein lies a sense of vulnerability
mentioned briefly earlier in this chapter: she does not want to be situated in an uncontrolled,
emotional sphere where she feels unable to protect herself. Gilson considers how people avoid
vulnerability for fear of being subjugated by another:
denials of vulnerability find their root in our rejection of our embodied and animal nature.
We perceive ourselves to be most vulnerable, most subject to injury, least in control of
ourselves and our fates, most at the mercy of others, and most like other nonhuman
animals as corporeal beings. (90)
This fear paralyses the narrator’s relationships and keeps new ones from forming. She finds it
far safer to fall back into rationality and avoid the so-called “animal” nature that relates more to
the emotional, bodily, and “inferior” side of the rational/irrational dualism. Despite these
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separations, Atwood’s narrator also recognizes problems associated with splitting the mind and
the body: “I’m not against the body or the head either: only the neck, which creates the illusion
that they are separate. The language is wrong, it shouldn’t have different words for them…they
would have to realize that if the head is detached from the body both of them will die” (Atwood
75). This passage suggests the importance of a connection between the mind and body that does
not deny one or the other. A balance must be reached. In her separation, the narrator feels like a
floating head of logic rather than a being that feels emotions: “At some point my neck must have
closed over, pond freezing or a wound, shutting me into my head; since then everything has been
glancing off me” (Atwood 106). There is pain in this separation, brought on by the narrator’s
will to avoid agonizing past memories. This willful ignorance is “an attempt to avoid what
might unsettle us…when we ignore we are necessarily avoiding our own vulnerability” (Gilson
86). In evading fear and vulnerability, the narrator rejects her emotional side; this keeps her
from forming worthwhile relationships, even with Joe: “What impressed him that time…was the
way I took off my clothes and put them on again later very smoothly as if I were feeling no
emotion. But I really wasn’t” (Atwood 24). Her lack of emotion keeps her from the pain but also
isolates her in such a way that she feels no longer alive: “if my body could be made to sense,
respond, move strongly enough, some of the red light-bulb synapses, blue neurons, incandescent
molecules might seep into my head…But the only thing there was the fear that I wasn’t alive”
(Atwood 112). Thus detached from her senses and relationships, the narrator has an “unfeeling
body” (Özdemir 67), that suggests, in Tom Ingold’s words, “Minds cannot subsist without bodies
to house them, and bodies cannot subsist unless continuously engaged in material and energetic
exchanges with components of the environment” (33). Hence, this separation from the body that
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leaves the narrator wondering about her vitality provides another possible reason for the narrator
remaining unnamed: she believes her existence does not warrant a name.
Along with her own mind-body alienation, the narrator reflects how mirrors and
cosmetics are restrictions created by patriarchal society to promote female conformity to
superficial beauty norms. Particularly, she observes her traveling companion, Anna, and how
she is confined to a realm of surface beauty that fails to acknowledge any subjective depth. The
narrator’s reflections on beauty connects to Wolf’s point that beauty is socially controlled and,
“Somehow, somewhere, someone must have figured out that they [women] will buy more things
if they are kept in the self-hating, ever-failing, hungry, and sexually insecure state of being
aspiring ‘beauties’” (66). Anna’s beauty is essential in her relationship with her husband, David;
her appearance is built off of slathering her face with makeup, and she claims David has never
seen her face without it (Atwood 41). The narrator also has not seen her face without it: “I
realized I had never seen her without it [makeup] before; shorn of the pink cheeks and
heightened eyes her face is curiously battered, a worn doll’s, her artificial face is the natural one”
(Atwood 41). Anna’s very image is made synthetic by her application of cosmetics and this
takes away her identity, making her appear doll-like even without the makeup. Such intensive
use of cosmetics can be associated with Wolf’s conversation on airbrushing wrinkles off
women’s faces in magazines, which makes a “value judgment…about the value of the female
life: that less is more. To airbrush ages off a woman’s face is to erase women’s identity, power,
and history” (83).
For the narrator, Anna’s use of mirrors and cosmetics artificially create a false self and
limit individual power. While Anna has control over her appearance, it is the only power she has
left. The compact mirror Anna uses contains “her other self” (Atwood 169) and she “unswivels
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a pink stick and dots her cheeks and blends them, changing her shape, performing the only magic
left to her” (Atwood 169). The narrator understands this lure of cosmetics when she remembers
how she was once drawn to the glamour of “Ladies in exotic costumes, sausage rolls of hair
across their foreheads, with puffed red mouths and eyelashes like toothbrush bristles: when [she]
was ten [she] believed in glamour, it was a kind of religion and these were [her] icons” (Atwood
39). These images she once looked up to are like Anna; they reveal a man-made beauty that
creates a world where “attraction grows blander and colder as everyone, first women and soon
men, begin to look alike. People lose one another as more masks are assumed” (Wolf 176-77).
There seems to be a close connection between these tendencies toward surface beauty and the
superiority of humans set within the logic of domination that Warren discusses. Furthermore,
Abram suggests that “Our fascination is elsewhere, carried by all these other media—these
newspapers, radio broadcasts, television networks, computer bulletin boards—all these fields or
channels of strictly human communication that so readily grabs our senses and mold our
thoughts” (The Spell of the Sensuous 258). The human communication he discusses relates to
these beauty ideals that can lead to the self caring for artificiality and surface perceptions,
consequently forming a muted version of the self (Wolf 3). Such a superficial self can lose sight
of the need to care for other, deeper relationships, such as with the natural world.
A link can be made between the airbrushing of female bodies and eco-pornography. My
discussion here presents an example of why the narrator experiences a socially conditioned sense
of alienation in the form of female identification with unrealistic (pornographic) body images,
which I link to “ecoporn” as an instance of how this can similarly alienate subjects from nature.
In "Ecoporn and the Manipulation of Desire,” Jose Knighton defines ecopornography as
photography of the environment that seeks to “appeal to, even seduce, the beholder with an
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image removed from its physical context, amplified into a commodity by technique…to evoke a
subjective response for commercial gain, to sell calendars and magazine subscriptions” (168).
Such photography fails to capture the reality and actual experience of the landscape, limiting
attachment or selling what is deemed beautiful at the expense of other profound landscapes.
Value becomes based on these particular advertisements in a manner that causes a “distorted
perception” (Knighton 169) situated in sameness. Eco-pornography associates with the
objectification of the female body in pornography, in which “close-ups of sexualized parts of
women’s bodies…[reduce] women to those parts of their bodies and [reduce] those parts to tools
for another’s sexual pleasure” (Gilson 158). In Surfacing, the narrator notes how David
perceives women as objects existing for the completion of his own desires when she thinks the
following: “he needed me [the narrator] for an abstract principle; it would be enough for him if
our genitals could be detached like two kitchen appliances and copulate in mid-air” (Atwood
153). This quotation relates how women can become “tools” for pleasure by focusing on
particular parts of the body rather than the whole person, much like the pictures of landscapes.
The removal of blemishes to create “perfect,” idealized images of both landscapes and women
serves to create an artificiality that erodes our capacity to appreciate natural beauty and a healthy
environment.
The false beauty the narrator analyzes extends to the objectification of the female body
that can lead to adverse vulnerability. The connection between negative vulnerability and the
objectified body is seen in the relationship between Anna and David, where Anna is susceptible
to derogation. In Gilson’s words, their relationship shows the “oppressive exploitation of
vulnerability” that connects to “the belief that vulnerability is a negative condition and the desire
to continue to avoid, ignore, and repudiate vulnerability by projecting it onto others” (91). The
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power dynamic between Anna and her husband exists on a battlefield where each attempts to
place the other in an inferior, vulnerable position. Anna does so by using her body: “Anna was
more than sad, she was desperate, her body her only weapon and she was fighting for her life, he
was her life, her life was the fight: she was fighting because if she ever surrendered the balance
of power would be broken and he would go elsewhere. To continue the war” (Atwood 155).
Anna’s body thus becomes a “weapon” she uses against David by having sex with his friend Joe.
However, such use of her body does not give Anna a healthy sort of power; rather, she plays into
the objectification of the female body and David’s misogynistic vision that “turns all women into
fashion models or dolls” (Wisker 24).
The objectification of Anna’s body is further presented when David tells her to get naked
for the documentary, “Random Samples,” he and Joe are creating. When Anna refuses, he states,
“It’s token resistance…she wants to, she’s an exhibitionist at heart. She likes her lush body,
don’t you? Even if she is getting too fat’” (Atwood 136). David’s control over Anna situates in
the dominance he feels he has by being her husband (Atwood 136). He states, “I’m all for
equality of women; she just doesn’t happen to be equal and that’s not my fault, is it? What I
married was a pair of boobs” (Atwood 139). Their marriage is one of possession, with David as
the possessor who judges and humiliates Anna through her body. When Anna complies with
David’s wishes and strips, the narrator watches her come out of the water, “She was really crying
now…Her pink face dissolving, her skin covered in sand and pine needles like a burned leech.
She went into the cabin without looking at me or saying anything” (Atwood 137). Anna’s
mortification leads the narrator to compare her image to a leech, a description she provides
earlier in the novel with the memory of her brother burning leeches: “they would writhe out and
crawl painfully, coated in ashes and pine needles, back towards the lake. Seeming to be able to
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smell where the water was. Then he would pick them up with two sticks and put them back in the
flames” (Atwood 132-33). This quotation shows that the narrator relates Anna’s helplessness to
those of the leeches—just as the brother controls the leeches’ cruel fates Anna’s husband tries to
control hers.
The narrator recognizes David as a liar and a man who likes to exist in the dominant
realm where he can take what he likes sexually from women. When the narrator denies his
sexual advances she gains power over him; she takes away his language and places him in the
awkward position: “The power flowed from my eyes, I could see into him…verbs and nouns
glued on to him and shredding away…he didn’t know what language to use, he’d forgotten his
own” (Atwood 153). In denying him, the narrator does not allow him to get back at his wife for
sleeping with Joe, preventing him from assuaging a vulnerability he does not wish to feel. The
narrator’s recognition of her capacity for power over patriarchal forces, including misogynistic
David, allows her to begin to overcome restrictions placed around the female body. She rejects
David and begins to favor the animal over the human, reflecting on how “he [David] was lying
about [her], [but] animals don’t lie” (Atwood 154). The animal becomes a central focus for the
narrator and further illustrates how value and language can negatively subordinate those
considered to be different within a patriarchal society.

III. The Blurring Human/Animal Binary: Value, Predator-Prey Relationships, and Science
The restrictions surrounding the narrator can be further analyzed by studying how the
human/animal binary leads to violence and limitations to both animals and groups of people,
particularly women. Surfacing reflects on the self-appointed “superior” position of humans in
comparison to animals through the notions of hierarchal value and willful ignorance. The
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intermingling between the two sides of the human/animal binary can be seen through the
narrator’s perspective on violence done to animals, predator-prey relationships, and the role of
scientific specimens throughout this novel. This analysis expresses the dangers of dualistic
thinking and shows how the narrator begins to associate more with the animal than the human,
leading to her transformative experience to escape patriarchal limitations.
Hierarchal value systems can separate humans from animals and lead to violence against
those deemed other. Stibbe analyzes the socially constructed values given to animals. He
suggests that animals remain restricted as “entities whose value lies either in rarity, size, or in
their ability to mimic human behavior” (83). Human superiority via categorization remains in
place because humans choose which animals have rights, which are extrinsic and exploitable,
and which are ignored entirely. A chilling connection exists between value and violence that can
be observed in Surfacing and will be analyzed in further detail shortly. Furthermore, the novel
studies the notion of chosen blindness via a logic that justifies violence against animals, which
Derrida touches upon: “No one can deny seriously, or for very long, that men do all they can in
order to dissimulate this cruelty [against animals] or hide it from themselves, in order to organize
on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding” (394). The animal/human binary that
exists encourages violence towards not just animals but humans categorized as animalistic.
Birke builds on this notion, stating, “The category of the sub-human…serves both to erase
specificities and to justify violence” (“Unnamed Others” 149). Hence, refusing to see
connections between humans and animals can lead to the justification of cruelty.
In this novel, the power of the “superior” human that solidifies the boundary between the
human and the animal becomes especially apparent through the relationship between the predator
(the human) and the prey (the animal). Plumwood studies the placement humans have in these
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predator-prey relationships, stating, “This concept of human identity positions humans outside
and above the food chain…as external manipulators and masters of it” (“Prey to a Crocodile”).
The narrator at first attempts to rationalize this superior positioning of humanity by attempting to
convince herself that humans act violently toward the environment largely to obtain the
sustenance needed to support life, such as food and resources. An example of her attempts to
rationalize this violence is when the narrator feels guilty about killing a fish, then thinks, “that’s
irrational, killing certain things is all right, food and enemies, fish and mosquitoes; and wasps,
where there are too many of them boiling water down their tunnels” (Atwood 62). In this
passage she draws on several examples of why killing has been justified: for food, for enemies,
for pests, and for population control. This rationalization of violence becomes increasingly
difficult to uphold until the narrator can no longer come up with excuses for such destruction.
She begins to acknowledge that cruelty done to animals can be (and is) done to other groups of
people.
Recognizing the injustice of violence against animals, the narrator particularly criticizes
hunters; her criticism shows the association between value and violence and the fact that animals
are not the only ones that suffer at the hands of the “superior” human. The narrator states,
There is nothing inside the happy killers to restrain them [the hunters], no conscience or
piety; for them the only things worthy of life were human, their own kind of human,
framed in the proper clothes and gimmicks, laminated. It would have been different in
those countries where an animal is the soul of an ancestor or the child of a god, at least
they would have felt guilt. (Atwood 129)
This passage clearly demonstrates how value and violence connect. Atwood studies specifically
occidental (Western) human “superiority” not just over animals but also over people who do not
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fit properly in the definition of “their own kind of human.” The narrator also touches upon the
notion of guilt, a guilt that, as Derrida suggests, is something to be ignored or desperately
forgotten (Derrida 394). Avoiding guilt can lead to a loss of sensitivity and care because such
evasion distances one from the problem at hand (or the wrong committed); in doing so, no active
solution or amendment can be reached, whether such avoidance is done consciously or
unconsciously. Furthermore, value becomes a justification for the violence discussed in the
above quotation; value acts as a means of forgetting those devalued by sweeping aside the
suffering of other entities. Stibbe develops this idea by analyzing how some view animals as
objects, stating, “Since inanimate resources cannot suffer, the discursive constrictions of animals
as resources contributes to an ideology that disregards suffering” (9). In the novel, this
objectification is presented in the violence done to the heron: “it was hanging upside down by a
thin blue nylon rope tied round its feet and looped over a tree branch, its wings fallen open. It
looked at me with its mashed eye” (Atwood 116). The narrator is greatly impacted by this scene
of unwarranted violence against a creature whose killers
…had strung it up like a lynch victim, why didn’t they just throw it away like the trash?
To prove they could do it, they had the power to kill. Otherwise it was valueless;
beautiful from a distance but it couldn’t be tamed or cooked or trained to talk, the only
relation they could have to a thing like that was to destroy it. (Atwood 118)
This passage shows how the heron’s value exists in the violent realm of maintaining power
through destruction. The narrator wants an explanation for this heartless violence, the way
history books identify why wars are fought or why lynchings were committed (Atwood 131).
However, she can find no reason but that of corrupt power that seeks to control through
subordination and extermination.

88

Comparing the heron to a lynch victim also has implications towards the unjustified
violence that occurred in slavery and its animalization of human beings. This relates to the
narrator’s belief that violence done to animals can just as easily be done to humanity itself:
“Anything we could do to the animals we could do to each other: we practiced on them first”
(Atwood 121-22). Such animalization also connects to Stibbe’s following statement: “The idea
that all humans have intrinsic value has been naturalized across a wide range of discourses,
meaning that it is assumed as a taken-for-granted and obvious fact about the world, rather than
something to be discussed or asserted” (95). In other words, history shows that all of humanity
does not have the right to intrinsic value, as can be seen by looking into past violence against
humans. Both the heron and the lynch victim represent an unwarranted brutality warped into
justification through the logic of domination.
David’s derogatory statement in Surfacing further shows how the separation between
humans and animals can create violence towards animals and specific groups of people. David
states, “Do you realize…that this country [Canada] is founded on the bodies of dead animals?
Dead fish, dead seals, and historically dead beavers, the beaver is to this country what the black
man is to the United States. Not only that, in New York it’s now a dirty word, beaver” (Atwood
36). This passage, particularly through the use of the term “beaver,” shows the link sexism and
racism have with animality; such negative, animalistic connotations serve to empower patriarchal
authority. Robert McKay studies this implied animality in “‘Identifying with the Animals’:
Language, Subjectivity, and the Animal Politics in Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing.” He
accurately states that these denigrations shows how “the bodiliness of female genitalia and
animality itself are both repressed, even symbolically butchered” by David in a “misogynistic
and speciesist” manner (216). Furthermore, David’s comment draws attention to the fact that
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countries have built by exploitive and violent practices, connecting slavery to the economic
dependency on animals. This passage also reflects that domination and exploitation of animals is
maintained in order to keep that sense of control and to avoid the realization that “Man is not the
center of animal life, just as the earth is not the center of the universe” (Grosz 24-5). The
maintenance of such control and ignorance of the interconnectivity of the world leads to this
violence against animals and “othered” groups of humans constructed as animalistic, such as
blacks and women.
David’s above statement unsettlingly shows how nations are often founded on violent
acts against others and how such horrors are often hidden from the surface. Similar to the
censorship of fairy tales, Surfacing reveals the danger of mythologizing national history in a
manner that conceals violence. Such concealment is another form of willful ignorance,
perceived particularly through the narrator’s claim to victimhood. This novel reinterprets the
myths that place Canada in the position of a vulnerable victim (as a dominated country colonized
by Britain and shadowed by the U.S.) by presenting similarities between Canada and the
narrator’s own victimization. Along with the destruction of animals, Canada’s history contains
violence against the natural world and other humans, particularly Native Americans, in the name
of development (Kapuscinki 116). The removal of violence from history prevents a holistic
understanding of the culture from forming or, in terms of the narrator, an understanding of
herself. Cronon articulates how avoiding history negatively creates a false identity, stating, “The
flight from history…represents the false hope of an escape from responsibility, the illusion that
we can somehow wipe clean the slate of our past” (16).
The critique on national myths and the victim/aggressor binary begins to break down
when the narrator can no longer place the blame on the American tourists for the violence done
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to animals, particularly the heron. McKay suggests the Americans serve as a type of scapegoat
that provides her with “an object onto which [she] can project the unwanted parts of [herself]”
(216). This becomes problematic when the protagonist discovers that the fishermen who killed
the heron are actually Torontians (Kapuscinki 113). The realization that fellow Canadians are
responsible for the bird’s mutilation begins to shatter the myth the narrator has created—namely,
the myth that the capacity of violence does not originate in Canada or herself. At this point in
the novel, however, she does not see her own capability for violence and retains what Janice
Fiamengo defines in "Postcolonial Guilt in Margaret Atwood's Surfacing," as a “victim fantasy”
that “brings a kind of peace, an escape from the anger and shame of acknowledged
responsibility” (148). In this manner, the narrator attempts to distance herself from the power she
sees as corrupt (Özdemir 68) while criticizing human cruelty towards animals (and other
humans). She analyzes and/or breaks down humanity’s self-appointed “superiority” by
observing the relationship humans have with meat, positioning herself in the role of prey, and
recognizing the link between humans, animals, and specimens in scientific research.
The narrator deconstructs the hierarchy that places humans in a superior position outside
of (or on top of) the food chain by seeing the link between humanity’s consumption of animals
and the fear of being consumed by them; this link poses a threat to notions of human identity as
separate from the animal, showing how the human/animal binary can be broken down. Adams
studies the dominant role consumption has, suggesting that meat becomes symbolic of the
authority men possess over animals (29). Moreover, Adams links this patriarchal authority over
animals to the dominance over women who are (symbolically) consumed within the
pornographic gaze. If meat is seen as power, hunting becomes another mode of asserting
categorical value. In “The Politics of Eating in the Novels of Margaret Atwood,” Emma Parker
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considers this dominance, stating, “The way that killing is linked to eating…suggests that eating,
like killing…is an expression of power” (114). The narrator in Surfacing interprets meat in such
a way, “The animals die that we may live, they are substitute people…And we eat them, out of
cans or otherwise; we are eaters of death” (Atwood 141). Here the narrator does not describe the
animals as “meat”—instead, the image that comes to mind is consumption of a carcass or
something dead (Adams 93), making humans “eaters of death.” For the narrator, animals are
“substitute people,” which connects the eating of animals to cannibalism. Atwood develops this
idea by comparing animals to humans, such as the frog on the fishhook that “goes down through
the water, kicking like a man swimming” (Atwood 61), and by looking at humans as a form of
food, “Starvation, bite your arm and suck the blood, that’s what they do on lifeboats; or the
Indian way, if there’s no bait try a chunk of your flesh” (Atwood 60). These images move past
the supreme role humans give themselves to reveal humans as prey with the same ability to
become the “meat” of a predator, reflecting the “shocking reduction, from a complex human
being to a mere piece of meat” (“Prey to a Crocodile”). Furthermore, Plumwood notes, “It
seems to me that in the human supremacist culture of the West there is a strong effect to deny
that we humans are also animals positioned in the food chain. This denial that we ourselves are
food to others is reflected in many aspects of our death and burial practices” (“Prey to a
Crocodile”). Interestingly, Atwood touches upon a similar idea when the narrator discusses her
wish to bury her mother naturally in the forest: “The reason they invented coffins, to lock the
dead in, preserve them, they put makeup on them; they didn’t want them spreading or changing
into anything else. The stone with the name and date was on them to weight them down”
(Atwood 151). This description brings up the idea of transformations at death and the fear of
becoming something other than human, such as meat or worm food. The quotation also touches
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upon the restrictive language that categorizes human individuality and attempts to maintain it
even in death with the gravestone as a marker.
Moreover, the narrator (as a woman) identifies with the negative vulnerability of animals
in patriarchal society, often constructing herself as the “prey” of aggressive men and/or a victim
of violence. Atwood continues to present the issue with human dominance over animals when
the narrator considers herself being hunted: “Behind me they crash…they talk in numbers, the
voices of reason. They clank, heavy with weapons” (Atwood 191). The men searching for her
are connected to logic and become the voices of reason she runs from. The narrator considers
the following: “They will be plotting a strategy for recapture or will they really go off and
discard me…stashing me away in their heads with all the obsolete costumes and phrases”
(Atwood 172). This passage provides a glimpse of her potential entrapment and how definitions
and words are used to confine—the narrator will either be physically captured or logically placed
in their minds, bound by the word “madness.” An analysis of the narrator’s so-called madness
will appear later in this chapter. Overall, the narrator as “prey” shows insight into the destructive
tendencies of humanity as violence against others is excused through the moral superiority that
exists in the logic of domination. Hence, in Plumwood’s words, there is a “need to acknowledge
our own animality and ecological vulnerability” (“Prey to a Crocodile”) for the good of the
whole as well as the parts. To be invulnerable is to reject the notion Abram touches upon: “The
body is an imperfect and breakable entity vulnerable to a thousand and one insults—to scars and
the scorn of others, to disease, decay, and death” (Becoming Animal 6). Such evasion of
vulnerability can result in the belief of superiority the logic of domination upholds;
invulnerability thus becomes a means of avoiding fear and one’s own susceptibility to other
surrounding entities.
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Atwood’s narrator continues to blur the boundary between humans and animals by
portraying the link between the construction of scientific subjectivity and the domination over
animals and women. She does so by reflecting on how her mother and eventually herself are
specimens in the eyes of science, like animals being studied in a lab. The narrator’s memory the
laboratory her brother had when they were children connects to the perception of animals as
objects of study. In her memory, the animals are dead or dying in the jars so the narrator frees
them. Her brother berates her, claiming that these specimens belonged to him, and, “Afterward
he trapped other things and changed the place; this time he wouldn’t tell [her]. [She] found it
anyway but [she] was afraid to let them out again. Because of [her] fear they were killed”
(Atwood 132). The fear the narrator experiences that prevents her from saving the animals
relates to her “sickening complicity, sticky as glue, blood on my hands, as though I had been
there and watched without saying No or doing anything to stop it” (Atwood 131) that she feels
with the heron; fear overrides her ability of reacting and saving the animals.
The objectification of animals in experiments relates to her mother’s terror of being
objectified by doctors and how science and technology can limit interconnectivity. The narrator
states, “She [her mother] hated hospitals and doctors; she must have been afraid they would
experiment on her, keep her alive as long as they could with tubes and needles even though it
was what they call terminal…and in fact that’s what they did” (Atwood 17). Her brother’s
laboratory and the experimental treatments on her mother in the hospital present a scientific
detachment from the living world. For the narrator, animals and her mother become specimens
in the eyes of science. Connecting to this viewpoint is Lorne Everndon’s following statement in
The Natural Alien: “We pride ourselves on our ability to get to the bottom of life’s mysteries,
that is, to reduce them to their basic components….knowing the nature of those parts and the
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way they are put together, man can not only understand but also control nature” (14). This
mechanistic model of control fails to recognize the subjectivity and ambiguity of nature,
including animals. In failing to do so, violence occurs, particularly in experiments involving
animals who are “replaced with abstractions” (Everndon 15) in order to alienate the scientist
from the empathy he/she might otherwise feel towards the test subject. Furthermore, breaking
down nature into categories rejects the unknown (and the fear sometimes associated with the
unknown). If science and technology create a detachment from nature to avoid emotions like
fear, the interconnections that could also be experienced are lost, leaving behind a normative
society.
Surfacing’s reflections on separation and loss of affection aligns with the narrator’s
perspective that humanity itself is “turning to metal, skins galvanizing, heads congealing to
brass” (Atwood 160). This lack of care rising from the estrangement between humans and the
natural world is what Hogan sees as a failure: “Through our failed humanity they [animals] are
vanishing, and along with them we are losing something of utmost importance: the human traits
of love, sympathy, and grace” (15). Like language, technology and science can restrict the
formation of a relational self that overcomes anthropocentric perspectives. According to Abram,
technology and science can be “interconnected facets of an astonishing dissociation—a
monumental forgetting of our human inherence in a more-than-human world” (The Spell of the
Sensuous 260). This is not to say that all technology and science is negative; rather, some
manifestations of these enterprises can (at times ignorantly) strengthen the schism between
humans and the living world by making animals, nature, and even humans into objects that exist
outside of caring perceptions. Such a separation leads to categorizations that reject the other and
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result in an isolating lifestyle based on sameness and lacking in creative forms of
interconnectivity.
In comparing herself to the animal during her abortion, the narrator reflects on how she
loses her power and subjectivity as a scientific specimen. As discussed earlier, the narrator
attempts to rid herself of the memory of her abortion, creating her story rather than facing the
pain associated with it. She relinquishes her power to the art teacher she had an affair with and
to the doctors that perform the abortion. The art teacher encouraged the narrator to get rid of
baby by comparing it to an animal: “He said it wasn’t a person, only an animal; I should have
seen that was no different” (Atwood 145). This quotation shows that the narrator (in contrast to
the art teacher) does not separate humans from animals on an ethical level (or as subjects of
ethical treatment). Her description of the aborting process furthers the notion of her being
objectified and her self-connection to animals:
They stick needles into you so you won’t hear anything, you might as well be a dead pig,
your legs are up in a metal frame, they bend over you, technicians, mechanics, butchers,
students clumsy or snickering practicing on your body, they take the baby out with a fork
like a pickle out of a pickle jar. (Atwood 79)
This description presents a horrifying image of the narrator’s subordination; it connects to her
perception of the cruelty towards animals in laboratories, such as the frog experiments in science
class or the “Pickled cat pumped full of plastic, red for the arteries, blue for the veins. At the
hospital…donate your body to science” (Atwood 121-22). All the narrator’s power to bring new
life into the world is taken from her in the hospital, further seen in the following passage: “they
shut you into a hospital, they shave the hair off you and tie your hands down and they don’t let
you see, they don’t want you to understand, they want you to believe it’s their power, not yours”
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(Atwood 79). She is tied down, shaved, and trapped. For the narrator, her inability to say “No”
makes her a killer, one of the humans that destroy lives (Atwood 144). Consequently, the
abortion leaves her unfeeling and she states, “[She] carried that death around inside [her],
layering it over, a cyst, a tumor” (Atwood 146). This notion of being complicitous in a death
that causes “[her] to be cut in two” (Atwood 109) results in the creation of the myth of her life.
However, by facing reality and acknowledging the abortion, the narrator opens herself to new
modes of communication and interconnections that allow a healing process to begin, one that
cannot occur in the restrictive, patriarchal society that surrounds her.

IV. Fluid Transformations and the Deconstruction/Embracement of Denigrating Myths
Throughout the transformational process, the narrator breaks down myths and boundaries
that denigrate women and animals in order to create a fluid self. She does so by rejecting
restrictive barriers formed by patriarchal society, deconstructing the fabricated story of herself,
finding new modes of communication, and opening up to relationships beyond humanity.
However, her attempts to deconstruct malign myths also entail a problematic embracement of
myths connecting to primitivist ideals and the viewing of native cultures as archaic and static.
This issue with mythmaking will be addressed in the next section following this analysis of the
narrator’s transformational experience into a relational self and her so-called madness.
The transformation of the narrator’s alienated identity begins when she recognizes that
the patriarchal boundaries have power over her in the form of human language that dominates
and devalues “inferior,” silenced voices. The narrator seeks to find a new means of
communication based in the ambiguous state in order to interact with other entities outside of
human society. She realizes that in order to transform into another type of intelligence she must
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first “immerse [herself] in the other language” (Atwood 159). This “other language” has nothing
to do with humanity. Rather, she “breaks down versions of language, space and self” (Wisker
30) to be able to listen to different forms of communication. According to Ward, in order to
separate herself from the dominant language, she must “painfully…deconstruct all the acquired
meanings which protect and enable a social self—to separate and, perhaps, after a process of
transition, to begin to acquire the rudiments of a new, seemingly alien, ‘language’, to become
incorporated into a different state” (98). The breaking down of meanings therefore becomes the
breaking down of the self. She opens herself up to a deconstruction of the familiar self without
fearing otherness or vulnerability as she has done in the past when she “would hear a rustling in
the forest and know it was hunting [her], a bear, a wolf, or some indefinite thing with no name,
that was worse” (Atwood 70). She originally fears otherness because she connects it to predators
but more importantly to the “indefinite.” Indefiniteness resists definition and creates an
ambiguity that threatens the flimsy order she has surrounded herself with in the form of her
myth. In breaking down her already fractured identity, the narrator opens up to “shattering the
ego and ideas of species superiority and privilege. This means recognizing animals as other
intelligent beings” (Metzger 361). Hence, she embraces the ambiguity and the otherness that
exists inside and around her.
The narrator’s deconstruction of her mythic identity provides an opening for her to
become interconnected with the life cycles, other animals, and the “animal” part of herself. First,
she has sex with Joe in order to replace her lost child and in doing so, she “can feel [her] lost
child surfacing within [her], forgiving [her]” (Atwood 165). The forgiveness presented here is
important because it allows the narrator to face and overcome the guilt she feels over her
abortion (this guilt being a major reason for creating her mythic life). Moving past this remorse
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can only occur when the narrator acknowledges it and no longer hides from it. According to the
narrator, her future child will be another being entirely, one covered with “shining fur” (Atwood
165). She claims that she “will never teach it words” (Atwood 165), further rejecting the
dominance and limitations of language. In this experience, she regains her power as a mother
and creator of life, stating, “This time [she] would do it by [her]self…The baby will slip
out…and [she’ll] lick it off and bite the cord, the blood returning to the ground where it belongs”
(Atwood 165). This statement shows her entrance into the natural realm, a place where life
cycles exist with no separation between humans and the earth. The being growing inside of the
narrator allows her to experience a physical transformation that connects her to both the
environment and the animal: “My body also changes, the creature in me, plant-animal, sends
filaments in me” (Atwood 172). Her identity thus becomes based on changeability that relates to
Derrida’s definition of différance. Grosz presents Derrida’s différance as “the irreducible
movement of self-transformations that defies identity confinement, definition, or control; the
endless possibilities of the world rewriting itself” (91). The narrator’s power in her
transformations comes from her own indefiniteness; she recreates herself, flitting from one
identity to another, and refuses to settle into any one constricting definition.
To become open to new forms of discourse that allow her to hold a communion with the
ambiguous state, the narrator destroys the materialistic, socially constructed human objects that
restrict her. The new intercourse the narrator seeks is similar to what Hogan describes as “…a
language, an opening between species, where something [is] spoken and communicated, not by
words as we think of them, but by feel[ing], by body, by pure life” (18). To be receptive to this
communication, the narrator violently rejects humanity in favor of the natural world and animal
self. She destroys the materials in her home, turns away the mirror so “it no longer traps [her]”
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(Atwood 181), and burns restrictive human language, “[she] rip[s] one page from each of the
books…to burn through all the words would take too long” (Atwood 182). Furthermore, she
damages past pictures of herself and the film that entraps Anna, “The film coils in the
sand…hundreds of tiny naked Annas no longer bottled and shelved” (Atwood 170). This
destruction of images associates cameras with “symbols of the split self and alienation
presumably because they falsely capture people in an objectified, hence distorted form”
(Özdemir 70). The burning of the pictures frees the bits of the narrator’s self that confines her to
being one particular thing just as the turning away of the mirror breaks away from the patriarchal
construction of narcissistic beauty as core to feminine identity. Moreover, the cabin becomes a
cage, a place that denies her power, and she escapes to the outdoors (Atwood 183). Such a
deconstruction of human order brings to mind Cixous’s description of women who choose not to
be restricted by patriarchal society: “They go by, fly the coop, take pleasure in jumbling the
order of space, in disorienting it, in changing around the furniture, dislocating things and values,
breaking them all up, emptying structures, and turning propriety upside down” (357). The
narrator discards the whole system of hierarchy through her rejection of the human and of
narcissistic identity by becoming an ambiguous being that resists interpretation. Instead, she
loosely identifies herself as an animal, exemplified by her belief that she can grow fur (Atwood
182), and her choice to live outdoors where she “leave[s] [her] dung, droppings on the ground
and kick the earth over. All animals with dens do that” (Atwood 183).
The relationship the narrator begins to form with the natural world goes beyond simply
recognizing the other; she opens herself up to the possibility of being a relational self, interacting
with a world such as the one Bennett presents: “In the world of vibrant matter, it is thus not
enough to say that we are ‘embodied.’ We are, rather, an array of bodies, many different kinds
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of them in a nested set of microbiomes” (italics in original 112-13). Bennett’s notion of
multipicitous identity closely associates with the idea of “becoming” that Deleuze and Guattari
discuss: “A becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short,
a multiplicity” (239). Becoming open to multiplicity allows the narrator to experience a positive
type of vulnerability on an emotional and physical level, permitting a reconnection between her
mind and body through interactions with the natural environment. She begins to change,
experiencing types of becoming that “undo set normative patterns and rigid ways of thinking and
feeling [to form] novel modes of living in their stead” (Gilson 139).
Emotionally, the narrator’s transformation or acceptance of herself as animal is part of a
healing process that as an isolated ego/alienated human being she could not obtain. Stibbe
discusses how connecting with nature can be a healing process, stating, “Learning to listen again
is important not only to relieving the suffering of animals, but also for relieving the
psychological damage that is occurring in technological societies as humans become isolated
from each other, from other animals, and from nature” (63). Atwood’s narrator experiences this
healing by opening up to animals and the environment, wordlessly communicating with, “A light
wind, the small waves talking against the shore, multilingual water” (Atwood 184). When she
dives into this water she is symbolically baptized, emerging as a different individual: “When I
am clean I come up out of the lake, leaving my false body floated on the surface, a cloth decoy”
(Atwood 183). The use of the term “multilingual” to describe the water suggests a conversation
that comes from a multitude of angles that the narrator recognizes through her listening state; in
paying attention, she forms a “greater appreciation of the complex entanglements of humans and
nonhumans” (Bennett 112) and the interrelationships between them.
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The narrator heals by being open to these new forms of communication, and she feels
herself physically transform into other beings, opening up especially to the frog and the trees. In
observing the frog, she feels that it “includes [her], it shines, nothing moves but its throat
breathing” (Atwood 185). The narrator intimately connects to the frog and notes it with
immense detail; by viewing the frog in such close proximity, she feels included and part of an
entity outside of humanity. She continues to form new relations and thus feels herself transform
away from and back to herself as an animal. For example, open to sensuous and continuous
transformations, she becomes a tree:
The forest leaps upward, enormous, the way it was before they cut it, columns of sunlight
frozen, the boulders float, melt, everything is made of water, even the rocks. In one of the
languages there are no nouns, only verbs held for a longer moment. The animals have no
need for speech, why talk when you are a word. I lean against a tree, I am a tree leaning.
(Atwood 187)
Through this transformation, the narrator’s body becomes one of the “living bodies” that Abram
describes as “not [locked] up [in] awareness within the density of a closed and bounded
object…[but] open and indeterminate; more like membranes than barriers, they [living bodies]
define a surface of metamorphosis and exchange” (The Spell of the Sensuous 46). The above
description of everything melting and becoming water suggests the fluidity and openness to
multiplicity during her transformative experience. The narrator transforms again: “I am not an
animal or a tree, I am the thing in which the trees and animals move and grow, I am a place”
(Atwood 187). As an animal, a tree, and a place, the narrator is openly receptive to her
surrounding environment and new languages that allow difference to prevail over sameness.
Such relationships fill her with life, replacing the death she has carried with her since the
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abortion (Kolodny 32). She finds a power in herself that, unlike the power in human society, is
not destructive because of her newfound awareness that bridges the gap between herself and the
environment. Thus, the narrator’s experiences as different entities cause a loss of restrictive,
human categorizations in the wake of a creative, deconstructive power.
While several critics perceive the narrator’s transformations as a descent into madness, I
would argue that they are her method of healing and dealing with a restrictive civilization. Susan
Schaeffer questions the narrator’s sanity, writing in “‘It is Time that Separates Us: Margaret
Atwood’s ‘Surfacing’” that “From the moment [the narrator] decides she must become an
animal, she is insane” (326). However, the narrator presents an awareness of what the humans
hunting her might think: “They can’t be trusted. They’ll mistake me for a human being, a naked
woman wrapped in a blanket: possibly that’s what they’ve come here for, if it’s running around
loose, ownerless, why not take it” (Atwood 189). This imagery is similar to the treatment of a
stray animal (or a woman without a patriarch). She knows the stereotypical definition they will
place upon her is insanity; hence, she cannot be caught out of the fear of what they would do to
her: “That’s the danger now, the hospital or the zoo…They would never believe it’s only a
natural woman, state of nature” (Atwood 196). Ward helps develop this conversation about the
narrator’s madness: “If the reversion of the narrator in Surfacing to a quasi-animal state is to be
thought of as madness, then it may be that some kinds of madness are approaches to sanity in a
society which resolutely defines its own sickness as a norm” (96). In other words, the perception
of madness in the narrator can be seen as a sane response when compared to the madness of the
culture as a whole (Özdemir 71). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, humans, according to the
narrator, are machine-like monsters; she fears them, and “can smell them and the scent brings
nausea, it’s stale air, bus stations and nicotine smoke mouths lined with soiled plush, acid taste of
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copper wiring or money” (Atwood 190). These humans are completely separate from the natural
world and she knows they will negatively take control of the vulnerability she allows herself to
feel in her relationship with the environment (Gilson 139). Interestingly, the narrator’s choices
are connected with N. Fairclough’s discussion of common sense: “If one becomes aware that a
particular aspect of common sense is sustaining power inequalities at one’s own expense, it
ceases to be common sense, and may cease to have the capacity to sustain power inequalities”
(qtd. in Stibbe 22). For the narrator, destructive power comes from the dominant, self-appointed
placement of patriarchal humanity. It is a power that works to limit her. Thus, she discards the
so called “common sense” of humanity by entering into the animal state; in doing so, she rejects
male-dominated, “rational” hierarchy and praises the natural world, the female, and the
ambiguous (Wisker 24).

V. The Protagonist’s Utilization of Malign Myths During her Transformation
Despite the numerous benefits incorporated in the narrator’s deconstruction of her own
biographical myths as well as those of a patriarchal society that promotes separation from nature,
her attempts to create new myths capable of overcoming isolation engage in politically
problematic appropriations of “otherness” that ironically bolster a racist ideology. The following
analysis will show why the myths she utilizes are problematic, especially the ones that draw
upon native cultures and primitivist ideals. The narrator attempts to appropriate Native
American beliefs of the natural world when she relies on cave drawings and nature gods as
sources of power and guidance during her transformation. This reliance, as well as her rejection
of society, connects to primitivism or “the belief that the best antidote to the ills of an overly
refined and civilized modern world [is] a return to simpler, more primitive living” (Cronon 13).
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The use of primitivism is problematic because it creates a type of mythic escapism that valorizes
the wilderness as pure and degrades civilization as tainted. Such a limited perspective
strengthens the binary between wilderness and civilization and they ultimately remain separated
at the end of this novel. According to Kathryn Spanckeren in “Shamanism in the Works of
Margaret Atwood,” the narrator experiences a primitive, “spiritual” journey to a new
understanding through Native American beliefs (183). The issue with this is that she defines and
uses Native American practices for her own purposes: “The Indians did not own salvation but
they had once known where it lived and their signs marked the sacred places, the places where
you could learn the truth” (Atwood 146). This statement shows how the narrator utilizes ancient
cave drawings in her attempts to discover “true vision” (Atwood 146) or the truth about herself.
Her reflection about native peoples “not own[ing] salvation” is the narrator’s way of noting that
the specific term “salvation” derives from Christianity and the belief in deliverance and not from
Native American tradition—she herself is not religious but interested in finding the “truth” that
can be found in the sacred places of Native Americans (Atwood 146). In order to find this truth,
the narrator places meanings on the cave paintings that guide and aid her through her
transformation. This projection of meaning is clearly seen in the following passage: “I had to
read [the drawings’] new meaning with the help of the power” (Atwood 159). The “power” here
comes from the “nature gods” the narrator constructs to help lead her through her transformation.
Similar to the frontier myth, the narrator’s use of primitivism erases both a history of
violence perpetuated by Europeans upon Native Americans as well as the specificity of
difference in native cultures (and their dynamism) in order to place her own definitions on the
cave drawings. The issue with this is that the narrator is mythologizing native cultures as
monolithic, archaic, and static without recognizing change. Fiamengo analyzes this erasure of
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native history in Surfacing, stating, “Native people are conveniently unnecessary (in fact, are a
hindrance) to the narrator’s appropriation of a timeless Native essence, and thus the narrator’s
sudden acknowledgment of Native gods depends…on the absence of Native people” (156). In
other words, the narrator’s connection with the cave drawings and imagined “nature gods”
removes contemporary Native Americans from the area. Her primitive escapism is thus
repeating a past history of clearing away Native American culture in favor of her own
transformative experience (Fiamengo 156). The narrator notes the absence of Native Americans
in her memory as a child, stating,
There weren’t many of them on the lake even then, the government had put them
somewhere else, corralled them, but there was one family left. Every year they would
appear on the lake in blueberry season…condensing as though from the air…faces
neutral and distanced, but when they saw that we were picking they would move on…It
never occurred to me till now that they must have hated us. (Atwood 85-6)
This quotation shows the Native Americans being “corralled” by the government and also
positions them as almost mythic themselves in their sudden appearance “as though from air.”
The hatred the narrator takes note of reveals the tensions between Native Americans and settlers,
a tension unrecognized during the narrator’s childhood and during her transformation. The
narrator uses these pictographs and the power of the nature gods to lead her to metamorphosis
and self-identification through the acknowledgment of her dead parents (Spanckeren 152). In
doing so, she recreates a myth similar to primitivism in which her truth can only be discovered
through her limited perceptions of Native American ritual and practice within the natural realm.
Problematically, this false “Native subjectivity is itself a form of denial” (Fiamengo 157) that
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entraps the narrator and hinders her re-entrance into society, largely due to the upkeep of the
wilderness and civilization binary.
Throughout her transformation, the narrator also draws upon mythic elements that
support a feminized version of the earth and which construct her parents as powerful archetypes;
these myths are less dangerous than the primitivist ideals discussed above because she ultimately
“humanizes” her parents rather than maintaining their mythic qualities. However, their roles
serve to separate wilderness from civilization and her mother’s archetype particularly idealizes
wilderness in a problematic manner. In the environment, the narrator discovers a power existing
outside of humanity, one that she sometimes fears. The power comes from the “gods” that exist
in the natural surroundings (discussed above), as seen when the narrator states, “I know they [the
gods] have gone finally, back into the earth, the air, the water” (Atwood 194). Her fear comes
from the vulnerability she feels, but the power does not position her in a victimized role. Rather,
she interacts with the power, largely because she personifies it into the forms of her dead parents.
While her father represents rationality, seen through his scholarly writings about the cave
drawings that “breathed reason” (Atwood 103), her mother is undeniably associated with the
natural world and holds a Mother Nature or Demeter-like role (Grace 38).
In a Mother Nature role, the narrator’s mother exists within the cycles of birth and death.
The narrator believes that her mother possesses the power of these cycles, originating from the
memory of her mother saving her brother from drowning (Atwood 28). This incident, along with
the mother’s affinity with nature, leads the narrator to mythologize her. Through this
mystification, the narrator reflects on the cycles that she herself is part of. Particularly, she
connects back to the dead heron, stating, “I remember the heron; by now it will be insects, frogs,
fish, other herons. My body also changes, the creature in me, plant-animal, sends out filaments in

107

me…I multiply” (Atwood 172). Such a statement show the continuity of life even after death,
and the narrator reflects on this ever-transforming cycle by seeing her unborn “plant-animal”
baby as the embodiment of this multiplicity. In this manner, the narrator sees her mother, her
unborn child, and the natural world as one. The narrator idealizes the wilderness setting through
her mother’s embodiment of goodness that “prohibit[s] cruelty” against others (Atwood 132),
contrasting with the violence the narrator positions with humans (such as the doctors exploiting
her mother’s body as a specimen). Thus, the narrator upholds the wilderness/civilization binary
by representing her mother as “pure” nature and civilization as “tainted” and violent.
While primitivism problematically remains a myth in the narrator’s life, she does break
down the mythic versions of her parents. Part of the narrator’s experience of becoming involves
letting go of the ghosts of her parents and allowing herself to see them as just humans: “They
dwindle, grow, become what they were, human. Something I never gave them credit for. But
their totalitarian innocence was my own” (Atwood 196). This quotation is important because it
shows the narrator’s recognition that she placed her parents outside of the capacity of human
error by making them god-like. Removing that “innocence” from her parents helps the narrator
to recognize her own capacity for violence. This violent capacity is further seen when the
narrator comes in contact with what she at first thinks is her father but then realizes it is not. She
describes the creature in the following manner:
I’m not frightened, it’s too dangerous for me to be frightened of it; it gazes at me for a
time with its yellow eyes, wolf’s eyes, depthless but lambent as the eyes of animals see at
night in the car headlights. Reflectors. It does not approve or disapprove of me, it tells me
it has nothing to tell me, only the fact of itself. (Atwood 193)
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The figure the narrator describes is monstrous, powerful, and suggestively has a predatory nature
(“wolf’s eyes”). The important connection comes when the narrator goes to where it was
standing after it disappears. She describes the following observation: “When I go to the fence
the footprints are there, side by side in the mud. My breath quickens, it was true, I saw it. But the
prints are too small, they have toes; I place my feet in them and find that they are my own”
(Atwood 193). This moment is one of self-recognition—the creature, “too dangerous” to be
frightened of, is actually herself. She can no longer deny her power or her ability to be violent.
By the end of her transformation, the narrator at some level seems to recognize the
danger of engaging with mythic representations (seen through her demystification of her
parents), but she also remains unconscious to certain malign myths that she uses. This newfound
awareness of myth in her life is reflected in her description of the jumping fish:
From the lake a fish jumps. An idea of a fish jumps. A fish jumps, carved wooden fish
with dots painted on the sides, no, antlered fish thing drawn in red on cliffstone,
protecting spirit. It hangs in the air suspended, flesh turned to icon, he has changed again,
returned to the water…I watch it for an hour or so; then it drops and softens, the circles
widen, it becomes an ordinary fish again. (Atwood 193)
This ambiguous passage shows movement from the real into the imaginative realm and then a
final return to quotidian experience. The narrator observes the fish and it becomes an “idea” that
connects back to the “protecting spirit” of a cave painting. This concept of “flesh turned to icon”
and back to “an ordinary fish” reflects a transformation in itself—one that shows how humanity
can mythologize and change reality into representations to suit certain needs. It appears that the
jumping fish allows the narrator to perceive some of her own iconic creations in her attempts to
find herself. Importantly, the jumping fish passage in the novel lies just above her realization

109

that the footprints are her own; hence, the myth that is being demystified is herself as an innocent
victim rather than her problematic embracement of native cultures and frontier ideals. Therefore,
while the narrator’s mythmaking during her transformation supports a creative release from her
initial lifestyle, it also serves as a problem, especially when she draws upon primitivism in an
unconscious manner. In failing to consciously recognize her problematic utilization of the
primitive notions of wilderness, she does not obtain a means of positively re-entering into the
dominant culture. Instead, she separates “healing,” pure nature she associates with primal
cultures from modernity’s corrupt, civilized world.

VI. Potentially Problematic Social Reintegration and Reconstructing (Violent) Separations
The narrator’s debunking of myths and (simultaneous) reliance on them in her
transformative experience leads to an ending that, while ambiguous, remains problematic in
terms of her potential return to society. One particular area of concern is the narrator’s continued
failure to conceive positive ways to negotiate power dynamics within her society. This failure
manifests in two ways: first, her dogmatic renunciation of “victimhood” and second in her
displacement of misanthropic violence that helps maintain the binary between wilderness and
civilization. The narrator’s complete renunciation of victimhood becomes an issue at the end of
this novel largely because of its idealized nature. She emerges from her transformation
“refus[ing] to be a victim” (Atwood 197) and states the following: “Unless I can do that [refuse
victimization] I can do nothing. I have to recant, give up the old belief that I am powerless and
because of it nothing I can do will ever hurt anyone” (Atwood 197). In “Margaret Atwood:
Beyond Victimhood,” Marge Piercy studies victimization in Atwood’s works, stating, “To cease
to be a victim, each of her protagonists fights an entirely solitary battle…Yet they must live

110

among others. Somehow the next step is missing. I don’t believe that one woman can singlehandedly leave off being a victim: power exists and some have it” (44). This quotation connects
to the narrator in Surfacing because it reflects the issue of her “single-handedly” refusing
victimization. Such a rejection of victimhood problematizes her reintegration into a society that
remains unequal. Societal inequality suggests an inability to avoid victimization entirely, calling
attention to her “Unless I can do that I can do nothing” statement from above. Such a comment
suggests that “do or die” mentality that the narrator exhibits and falsely suggests that all
solutions to the problem of victimization are in the control of the victimized classes. Whether
the narrator chooses to stay or go back to humanity remains ambiguous. Joe becomes a
motivator that pushes her in the directions of wanting to stay in or leave the wilderness. She
presents him as a type of mediator, “offering [her] something: captivity in any of its forms, a new
freedom?” (Atwood 198). This type of freedom provides another potential means of being a
relational self. She observes Joe as “only half formed, and for that reason [she] can trust him. To
trust is to let go. [She] tense[s] forward, towards the demands and questions, though [her] feet do
not move yet” (Atwood 198). Such a comment suggests that she will join Joe because she places
trust in his “half formed” qualities that remain outside of patriarchal normativity, such as his own
vulnerability. While a possible relationship of equals is suggested between Joe and the narrator,
an alternative interpretation would be to perceive the narrator as working her power over the
“half formed” Joe. This would place him in a vulnerable role that might fall into victimhood,
especially if the narrator rejects any possibility that she could be a victim unless she “wills” this
fate.
Another issue is that the novel ends with the narrator maintaining the misanthropic idea
that power in the hands of humanity always leads to violence. The narrator still perceives homo
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sapiens in a negative manner and feels a sense of duty to watch them: “Then back to the city and
the pervasive menace…They [humans] exist, they’re advancing, they must be dealt with, but
possibly they can be watched and predicted and stopped without being copied” (Atwood 195).
This quotation is disconcerting because the narrator still perceives humans as menacing and
wants to stop them without presenting a means of doing so. Disturbingly, earlier in the novel the
narrator wishes she had “a button [she] could press that would evaporate them [humans] without
disturbing anything else, that way there would be more room for the animals” (Atwood 155).
The narrator’s perceived powerlessness at the beginning of the novel leads to this repressed rage
and misanthropic fantasies directed at all of humanity; such violent thoughts still exist at the end
of this novel. If such a button existed, it would be extremely violent as a tool of mass
extermination, and would “reveal[-] that attempts to rid the world of abusive power can so easily
slide into a terrorism that replicates that power’s very logic” (McKay 222). In this sense, the
narrator does not see power as existing without violence, making her newly accepted power
dangerous. Such a statement also reflects on the narrator’s incapacity to actively negotiate power
and violence in her own life as she perceives herself on the outside, referring to humanity as
“them.” Similarly, her statement at the end of the novel, “They exist, they’re advancing…” uses
the term “they,” maintaining her separation from humanity.
Cronon critiques these misanthropic wilderness ideologies that see the mere presence of
humans in wilderness as destructive (19). He states that a misanthropic notion is unproductive,
existing as “a self-defeating counsel of despair” (19) that does not serve any useful solution
because it suggests, “the only way to protect sacred wilderness from profane humanity, would
seem to be suicide. It is not a proposition that seems likely to produce very positive or practical
results” (19). The narrator actively separates “profane” humanity from “sacred” wilderness
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while maintaining her belief that violence and power go hand in hand. She fears “copying”
humanity and becoming like them, connecting to the virus imagery she uses earlier to describe
the “American” hunters who killed the heron: “they’re what’s in store for us, what we are turning
into. They spread themselves like a virus, they get into the brain and take over the cells”
(Atwood 130). Humanity as virus-like, dangerous, and violent all feed into the misanthropic
fantasies of the narrator, making her potentially destructive. Even the narrator’s transformation
exhibits these destructive tendencies because she attempts to obliterate all things human in the
cabin; this is problematic because she herself is human and seeking to deny such a link opens the
way for violence against what she “others” (namely, her human side). The narrator’s failure to
adequately address her own misanthropy (even at the end of her story) runs the risk of
mythologizing modern humanity as irrevocably destructive towards the natural world; this leaves
little room for the creation of a co-existing lifestyle that does not revolve around violence and the
destruction of the other.
The narrator fails to conceive power as a positive or affirmative alternative to patriarchy,
instead only seeing the violence associated with it. This failure is another obstacle to the
narrator’s “positive” reintegration into society, leaving behind bitterness and a reconstruction of
binaries. She states how originally she, “was not prepared for the average, its needless cruelties
and lies. [Her] brother saw the danger early. To immerse oneself, join in the war, or to be
destroyed. Though there ought to be other choices” (Atwood 195). This passage is interesting.
While the narrator now has the ability to choose she still only recognizes two options—to be
powerful and join “the war” (human existence) or be demolished by that “average” human
power. She realizes that “withdrawing is no longer possible and the alternative is death”
(Atwood 197), choosing to live with the acceptance of her power and therefore her capacity to
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harm others. She appears willing to take part in “the war” but as a pessimistic outsider existing
in her individual self-empowered state that separates her from active (and potentially positive)
integration with society where power can possibly lead to change without falling into violence.
Furthermore, her choice to take part in “the war” is attached to her unborn baby that may or may
not exist: “I can’t know yet, it’s too early. But I assume it: if I die it dies, if I starve it starves
with me…it must be born, allowed” (Atwood 198). The narrator’s life therefore connects to this
potential child, making one wonder if she will become self-destructive if it does not exist.
But why does the narrator see no other options besides joining “the war” or being
destroyed? Within her transformative state, the narrator experiences a type of power based on
multiplicity and interaction rather than destruction; similarly, she experiences vulnerability in a
manner that does not place her in the role of the victim. Positioning the narrator to choose
between embracing destruction or being destroyed herself reactivates that power-violence
association; it makes the transformative process a healing experience but also a type of mythic
escapism similar to her initial lifestyle. Fiamengo builds on this issue, stating that her
“[p]ersonal transformation does nothing to alter the relations of domination that structure our
lives…for the future to which the narrator returns promises only marginal change and potentially
renewed isolation from the horror of the world” (158). The hope in the novel’s ending lies in its
ambiguity. The fact that the narrator has a choice and wants other options leaves some room for
an existence beyond the perspective of humanity being hardwired for destructive tendencies—
but not much. The major issues exist in the primitivist myth she embraces as a form of escapism
and her misanthropic fantasies that separate human violence from the “pure” environment. The
narrator’s negotiation of this violence, particularly through the fairy tale element of
metamorphosis, is therefore flawed; it creates a nondestructive, co-existent relationship between

114

humanity and the natural world that can only exist within a wilderness setting, “fail[ing]
precisely because it…entails a rejection of human community” (McKay 222). I would therefore
argue that while the ending and the narrator’s ultimate choice is ambiguous, by maintaining her
misanthropic perspective and unconsciously supporting the myth that humans are wired for
violence, her relational self exists only within an idealized realm of nature uncontaminated by
other humans. In this manner, humanity and its violent potential is abjectly othered by the
narrator, once again creating a dangerous separation from the natural world.
The notions of transformation in Surfacing are ambiguous and deconstructive. The
narrator removes the skin of societal definitions in favor of animal-becoming. Her
transformations place importance on the body and emotions over logic while at the same time
working to destroy mind and body dualism. In returning to her human state there is hope that the
narrator’s body is now whole and the humanist means of separating the body from the mind are
defeated. However, the ending also presents a return to a mode of thinking that promotes
violence and suggests the unattainability of a nondestructive existence between humans and the
natural world. The narrator’s relational self is therefore threatened by her incapacity to separate
power and violence, which in turn reveals that the protagonist’s negotiation of violence in
relation to identity as problematic. In this manner, the process of mythmaking is potentially
dangerous, especially when the myths created are done so at an unconscious level. Surfacing
therefore reflects a cautious outlook on the mythmaking approach.
Despite this, the transformations themselves show the importance of openness towards
various modes of being, including recognizing the other that has been restricted and pushed away
because of its ambiguity. Butler develops this point well,
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The task is to refigure this necessary ‘outside’ as a future horizon, one in which the
violence of exclusion is perpetually in the process of being overcome. But of equal
importance is the preservation of the outside, the site where discourse meets its limits,
where the opacity of what is not included in a given regime of truth acts as a disruptive
site of linguistic impropriety and unrepresentability. (Bodies that Matter 53)
The outside, or the ambiguous, is a place of creativity and imagination. It allows for
transformations to occur, ones that exist outside of the realm of order and the justified logic of
domination that serves to restrict the body, the environment, and society into dualistic notions
that place meanings on those who cannot be identified in such simplistic terms. The movement
away from such limitations leads to an “unsettling [of] ‘matter’ [that] can be understood as
initiating new possibilities, new ways for bodies to matter” (Butler, Bodies that Matter 30).
Surfacing exhibits the destruction of the human/animal binary in favor of recognizing
interconnectivity and difference as positive fields of invention. Bennett speaks in favor of this
engagement with diversity: “Give up the futile attempt to disentangle the human from the
nonhuman. Seek instead to engage more civilly, strategically, and subtly with the nonhumans in
the assemblages in which you, too, participate” (116). The self is built on relationships and
therefore experiences constant changes through each new encounter, demonstrating the fluidity
of the self. Rather than engaging in sameness, Surfacing suggests the importance of being open
to the unfamiliar. Atwood’s writing creates an ambiguous realm of uncertainty where the
imagination runs into various complications and expands beyond structure; her writing
invigorates a language that can be restrictive but also alive with changing perceptions.
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Conclusion
Encountering Ambiguity and Encouraging Difference
Analyzing the role of myths and fairy tales in Carter’s “The Tiger’s Bride” and Atwood’s
Surfacing opens up an awareness to societal restrictions that seek to separate the self from the
other, the human from the animal, and the male from the female. There is a need to recognize
how certain social myths and norms in Western culture are limiting in the way they reject
difference, define value, and negate otherness. In becoming conscious of these myths, one can
potentially break them down or recreate them to better fit a more ecocentric sense of living—a
living based on care rather than violence and multiplicity rather than singularity. Focusing on
the role of mythmaking (in literature and in society) provides another means of interpreting the
various relationships humans (can) have with the environment. Similarly, studying femaleanimal transformations through the theoretical lenses of post-structuralism, postmodernism,
animal studies, and various types of feminism (particularly ecofeminism) encourages a more
diverse understanding of the interconnections that exist in the world. My research reflects how
oppressive frameworks can be broken down through the engagement in mythmaking and
transformative processes that lead to a self more situated in fluidity rather than stagnation. These
two authors’ literary works reflect an innovative creativity that seeks to evaluate, deconstruct,
and reconstruct relationships based on interactions with the more-than-human realm.
Carter and Atwood use mythmaking and fairy tales in different ways that show an
impressive array of interpretations on how myths can impact people’s lives and identities. Carter
states, “I never believe that I’m writing about the search for self. I’ve never felt that the self is
like a mythical beast which has to be trapped and returned so you can be whole again” (qtd. in
Gamble 10). Carter’s words act as freeing agents for the self; she acknowledges that her writing
does not attempt to discover, reclaim, or provide an exact definition of a person’s being. To “be

117

whole again” through an ultimate discovery of the self becomes restrictive and limiting in its
singularity. Carter recognizes a world of diversity and continuous interaction, a world made up
of constant alterations to the self through relationships. This recognition promotes multiplicity
and joins in the celebration of creativity. Her writing displays the promise of how active
engagement in mythmaking can lead to a fluid self that exists in equality. Atwood’s work
similarly reflects on the freedom that can come from demythologizing certain myths in life and
taking part in mythopoeic creations. At the same time, Surfacing reflects the danger of
unconscious mythmaking that can re-form binaries based on hatred. This hatred is seen at the
end of the novel where the narrator perceives civilization as corrupt and thus threatens her
“positive” re-entrance into society. The use of myth becomes a major difference between these
two authors, with Atwood’s more cautionary approach contrasting with Carter’s poststructuralist approach that seeks to break down (and at times destroy) all boundaries in a
celebratory manner.
Studying human-animal transformations in Carter and Atwood provides a further
understanding of the detrimental separation between humanity and the natural world, particularly
with the animal. Analyzing these transformations reveals the interconnections that exist between
the human and the animal and how certain binaries create barriers to prevent these connections.
Limiting these potential relationships connects to what Everndon describes as “sever[ing] the
vocal cords” (17) of the earth, much like what is done to an animal in a lab: “He [the
physiologist] was denying it [the animal] in that he was able to cut the vocal cords and then
pretend that animal could feel no pain…the desperate cries of the animal would have told him
what he already knew, that it was a sentient, feeling being” (Everndon 17). In this passage,
Everndon acknowledges how humans can destroy such connections to the “sentient, feeling
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being” out of guilt and a fear of association that blurs the boundary separating the human from
the animal. The cutting of the vocal cords connects to the inferior positioning of animals based
on their incapacity to speak the human language. Such oppression of animals directly connects
to the subjugation of other human beings associated with animals in derogatory and
discriminating ways. In particular, female-animal transformations seek to deconstruct the
separation between the human and the animal while breaking down other binaries upheld by
patriarchal frameworks of Western society, such as the rational/irrational, the mind/body, the
aggressor/victim, and the male/female. The experience of metamorphosis encourages a
movement away from dualistic thinking and towards the embracement of diverse relationships
based on alterity, creativity, and the establishment of a fluid self. Furthermore, these
transformations reveal the importance of listening and being open to different modes of language
based on feelings and reflections more than words.
Through the creation and development of this thesis, I have encountered numerous
questions, ideas, and reflections that can serve as foundations for further analysis if future
opportunities of study present themselves. I would like to go into further detail in both of my
chapters on how various religious beliefs can oppress women and animals and how such beliefs
impact patriarchal societal norms; it would be interesting to study how various creation myths,
such as Genesis and the fall from Eden, connect to “The Tiger’s Bride” and Surfacing.
Furthermore, I wish to extend my research to encompass other works by Carter and Atwood. For
Carter, I would welcome the chance to study her other retelling of “Beauty and the Beast” called
“The Courtship of Mr. Lyon,” and how this story compares and contrasts with the “The Tiger’s
Bride” in ideas on relational selves, subordination, and animality. Carter’s other fairy tales about
werewolves, such as “The Company of Wolves,” “The Werewolf,” and “Wolf-Alice,” also
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connect to female-animal transformations, and would be a great extension for my project in
terms of understanding how Carter mediates violence in her fairy tales. Furthermore, studying
how contemporary society presents these fairy tales in movies, television shows, and other
literary works might be an interesting way of reflecting the influence these stories continue to
have on people’s lives and in their imaginations.
In regards to expanding my research on Atwood, I would be drawn to her other works
that study the blurred binary between humans and animals, such as the Oryx and Crake trilogy.
In particular, these books contain interesting passages on science in relation to animals and
women, and also the threat to human language in an (post) apocalyptic setting brought on by
humanity. The danger of viewing humanity as the “superior” controller, especially in terms of
science, would also add more depth to my thesis as a whole in relation to the research done by
Lynda Birke and Lorne Everndon. Moreover, Oryx and Crake also reflects on the stories of
creation and ideas on God, connecting to my wish to expand on how religion influences societal
norms and vice versa. Another one of Atwood’s novels, The Robber Bride, might also be
interesting to study in terms of reverse gender victimization and violence; this novel also is a
retelling of the fairy tale, “The Robber Bridegroom,” which would allow me to analyze how
Atwood uses a whole fairy tale (rather than just elements of the fairy tale) and how that
compares to Carter’s use of fairy tales.
I would also appreciate the chance to extend my research to other authors who utilize
human-animal transformations and myths in unique ways. In particular, from when I first started
this project I was interested in the contemporary Native American author Linda Hogan and how
she represents the relationship between humans, animals, and the environment in her works. In
particular, Hogan’s novel Power and her book of poetry, Rounding the Human Corners, drew
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my attention because they both reflect how the interconnections between humans and animals
require respect. Power takes place in contemporary society and the narrator is a young Native
American woman; this would add another dimension to my conversation concerning the narrator
in Surfacing and how she problematically views native cultures as archaic. Studying Hogan’s
works would therefore provide an alternative to the Eurocentric perspectives in Carter and
Atwood’s texts. Two other ways of expanding my research would be to analyze other nonWestern writers in relation to human-animal transformations and also to study in depth how
other groups of people are derogatorily connected to animality. These two topics of expansion
would allow me to gain a more holistic perspective on my research, but I also believe that they
can stand as separate projects entirely from my current thesis.
One of the major questions I came across throughout my research was the following: but
what if the abject “other” encompasses truly negative qualities that impede positive, fulfilling
relationships? I feel that this question could raise criticism and would lead to further research
analysis. Working largely with the ambiguous realm in analyzing the writing of Carter and
Atwood, my conversation resists distinct definitions and remains open to interpretation with the
recognition that everyone has different experiences and opinions. The positive strength of
difference existing in ambiguity and the creativity that can expand from it is something I attempt
to articulate throughout this project. However, I found myself wondering about the abject other
and recognizing that ambiguity can also contain negatively violent and destructive tendencies
that could not possibly lead to positive relationships. Kristeva notes how abjection rejects order,
connecting it to “The in-between, the ambiguous, [and] the composite. The traitor, the liar, the
criminal with a good conscience, [and] the shameless rapist. The killer who claims to be a
savior…Any crime, because it draws attention to the fragility of the law” (4). The above
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examples Kristeva gives provides an understanding of why abjection and the ambiguous other
might be feared and avoided. In her example, the law exists in order and sameness, while
criminal actions can be considered “other” (criminals have also been connected to animals in the
past through studies in mental degeneration). Thus lines appear, boundaries of morality that each
person contains; it was hard for me at times to find a way to express the celebration of ambiguity
while recognizing the darkness that can lie in it as well. This problem came up in Carter’s
chapter with the discussion on vulnerability and how, while Gilson promotes a positive
vulnerability, it is important to recognize the existence of a negative vulnerability that oppresses
and promotes violence. I took solace in the fact that analyzing ambiguity meant that I did not
need all the answers, but I still needed to find a way of handling this quandary that existed in
relation to my own moral ideas.
In an attempt to answer this question, I found myself reflecting on the abject other as
something that could be internal as well external. For example, the fear of being associated with
the animal could be seen as an internal struggle. I focused particularly on the concepts of
otherness that extend from oppressive binaries, such as the placement of animals, the
environment, and women in the realm of the other. Value hierarchies also became important to
my analysis in the way they are used to elevate some and devalue others. By limiting what I
analyzed as the other, I was able to focus my analysis and comment on how relationships can be
restricted due to separations. Such separations, particularly between the self and the other, can
potentially be crossed to limit degradation. This idea of crossing is seen in my analysis of
human-animal transformations that attempts to reveal the blurring binary between humans and
animals; it also reflects upon the potential goodness that can come from recognizing these
similarities (between humans and animals) because it encourages more diverse thinking.
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Interestingly, while I critique the restrictive sameness social hierarchies put in place, I am also
using similarities to reach across the gulf between humans and animals. This in itself would be
another question to answer with further research: how can similarities be both positive and
negative in understanding relationships?
I am not saying that all oppressions can be solved by breaking down or reaching across
restrictive boundaries—doing so would not be recognizing the diversity of world cultures,
people, and the complexity of frameworks and structures that hold power over others. However,
I do believe that acknowledging the existence of all types of otherness (even the negative) is
important to interacting with the world. For example, choosing to be blind to or to censor a
country’s historical violence, such as the ill treatment of Native Americans, cannot lead to caring
perceptions, open communication, or reparation. Not understanding the history or the creation of
oppressions can lead to the maintenance of these suppressions or the danger of a repeat offense.
This danger also extends to environmental crises that occur repeatedly through the continuance
of human practices that are harmful to both humans and the natural world with fear, attempts to
avoid guilt, and greed leading to limited viable solutions. There needs to be an
acknowledgement of what is othered and/or ignored in order to recognize and begin to
understand why certain groups of people, the natural world, and the individual self can be
oppressed by what is deemed “the norm.” There is a hope that through this acknowledgement,
stronger relationships and creative solutions can form. As Abram states, “Some of the most
versatile ideas are entirely multiple, embodied by a thousand humming lives lofting and veering
in concert” (Becoming Animal 118). Interconnectivity, whether visible or not, exists. Being
interconnected with the past, the present, and the future, as well as the natural world, makes it
necessary to protect and appreciate what we depend on in living our lives.
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My thesis therefore shows on a small scale how the recognition of oppression/censorship
can help lead to the formation of relational selves that do not exist in isolation (and the problems
that arise from remaining in a static state). At a large scale, these ideas can be the basis of
further analysis related to (non-academic) social and environmental oppressions. These ideas
can show how openness and outreach can actively inform and battle against subordination and
degradation (particularly in the ill treatment of animals and women). In this sense, the relational
selves that seek to “develop a more complex and sophisticated understanding of the ways in
which natural forces, both living and nonliving, frame, enrich, and complicate our understanding
of the subject, its interior, and what the subject can know” (Grosz 86), become essential to these
transformative projects that encourage participation. Grosz’s above statement reflects that
knowledge can be continuous, definitions can be broken, and that alterity can be a positive,
unique experience for all entities involved. Hence, life based on these interactions encourages a
means of “apprehending the world” not as a “matter of construction but of engagement” (Ingold
35).
Overall, Carter and Atwood utilize language in an innovative, imaginative manner that
deconstructs certain myths and reestablishes the importance of interrelationships. Both authors
encourage new modes of thinking by operating in the realm of the ambiguous and often the
abject to destabilize hierarchal structures. Writing becomes a method of reflecting upon
relationships, and, according to Stibbe, “through this symbolic world [of writing]” people can
“be reached initially and encouraged to enter into new relationships with the more-than-human
world” (146). In this manner, the writings of Carter and Atwood take part in “a multiple and
inexhaustible course with millions of encounters and transformations of the same into the other
and into the in-between” (Cixous 353) that resist boundaries and take pleasure in knocking down
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oppressive frameworks. The very ambiguity of “The Tiger’s Bride” and Surfacing resists
definition and promotes inventive thought developed through ever-changing relationships
between the self and the natural world. In this manner, a vibrant kaleidoscope of continuous
interactions and exchanges, one that shifts with every transformative encounter, comes into
being.
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